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Abstract 
This study focuses on Canada's involvement in the 
informal discussions that ultimately led to the creation 
of the International Monetary Fund, These discussions, which 
involved three main participants, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, took place during 19^0-19^3 
established the basic format of the plan used at the Bretton 
Woods conference in 1944. 
During the discussions of I940-I943, two proposals 
for an international financial organization, one British and 
one American, were considered. In part, the differences in 
the two proposals were owing to the differences in the British 
and American international financial situations. It was the 
task of Canadian officials to not only advocate the proposal 
that was beneficial to Canadian interests, but also to main- 
tain Anglo-American cooperation. It is argued that the 
position taken by Canadian officials was based on past Csinadian 
trade and financial experiences, as well as on expectations 
of the postwar world. However, Canada needed "both Britain 
and the United States in her trade and financial network, 
hut this was not assured in either proposal. In fact, it 
often seemed as though Britain and the United States would 
not he a part of the same international financial organization. 
Moreover, there was also a fine line between achieving Anglo- 
American cooperation and being faced with an Anglo-American 
diktat, which Canadian officials had to deal with. 
Although Canadian officials considered either pro- 
posal an improvement over the situation that existed in the 
interwar period, they nevertheless believed that further 
benefits to Canada could be achieved through active Canadian 
participation throughout the informal discussions. With all 
of these considerations in mind, Canadian officials drafted 
a Canadian proposal which was presented in 1943* 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main obstacles to arriving at a reasoned 
understanding of Canadian involvement in international 
financial matters dtaring the 19^0*s is the misconception of 
the United: Kingdom's and the United States* influence on 
Canadian decision making. In recent years several studies 
have emerged that focus on Canada’s relationship with the 
United States. By far the predominant theme of these studies 
concerns American domination over many facets of Canadian 
life. However, much of the perception of American domination 
comes from the experiences of the 1950*s and 1960*s when a 
tremendous influx of American investment was flowing into 
CanadaYet many studies concerning this influx of American 
capital report that the cause lay in an earlier period. For 
example, Jim Laxer, writing on the political economy of 
Cauiada, claimed that "the establishment of the permanent 
joint defence board on August 17» 19^0 marked the political 
2 
transition of Canada into the American empire.Similarly, 
Donald Creighton claimed that 
the process by which the Dominion became a branch-plant 
dependency and a military satellite of the American 
Republic began with the Ogdensburg Agreement of 19^0; 
and since then Canada's subordination to American foreign 
policy and American capital has continued progressively 
with scarcely a serious interruption.2 
The crucial question of how these experiences during 
the war led to later American economic domination is left 
virtually tmaddressed. Statements similar to Creighton's 
critical pen of William Lyon Mackenzie King are inadequate; 
William Lyon Mackenzie King had systematically under- 
mined Canada's connections with Britain; and instead of 
strengthening her national self-sufficiency, he had 
simply replaced the broken imperial ties with infinitely 
stronger continental bonds, which had effectively 
shackled Canada to the United States.3 
An examination of the total international financial environ- 
ment in which Canadian officials operated must be considered. 
Vernon Fowke's analysis of national policy in Canada 
offers an alternate perception of Canadian economic policy. 
In his article, "The National Policy - Old and New", Fowke 
states, "in its broadest aspects the national policy was 
the design of creating a national political and economic \mit 
^Jim Laxer, "Introduction to the Political Economy of 
Canada", in Robert Laxer (ed.). The Political Economy of 
Dependency, (Toronto; McClellauid and Stewart Ltd., 1973)» 
P- 3^- 
p 
Donald Creighton, Towards the Discovery of Canada. 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), p. I69. 
^Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century, 1867- 
1967. (Toronto; Macmillan of Canada, 1970), p. 2o8. 
Stressing in the British North America of a century ago. 
the evolutionary nature of the Canadian national policy, 
Fowke did not restrict his analysis of the national policy 
to the National Policy of the late nineteenth century. 
Instead, he placed the National Policy, as well as the 
creation of the Dominion in 186?, as part of the first 
national policy whose origins could he seen as early as 
1825.-^ According to Fowke, "the economic objective of the 
first national policy was the creation of a new frontier of 
investment opportunities for the commercial and financial 
interests of the Saint Lawrence.”^ Elaborating on the 
economic objective of the first national policy, Fowke 
writes, "by the middle of the nineteenth century these 
interests thought of investment opportunities in terms of 
7 
large-scale agricultural immigration and settlement . 
Viewed in the light of Fowke*s concept of the national 
policy. Reciprocity with the United States in the 1850*s 
and tariff protection in the late nineteenth century were 
both instruments used in the development of am integrated 
national economy. The fulfillment of this first national 
Ur 
Vernon Fowke, "The National Policy - Old and New", 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 18 
(August 1952);272. 
^Ibid., pp. 275-76. 
p. 275. 
policy was seen in the years 1900-1930 when Canada experi- 
enced a tremendous growth in population and in agricultural 
production. 
Owing to the disruptions caused by the First World 
War, the ’new* national policy, as seen by Fowke, began 
only after 1920. However, this second national policy 
” . was not a great project waiting to be set in motion 
again but a number of comparatively minor changes which 
required completion in order that the Canadian economy might 
g 
operate satisfactorily within its existing limits.” In his 
article, "The End of an Imperial Economy: Anglo-Canadian 
Disengagement in the 1930*s”, R.F. Holland notes the major 
obstacle to the satisfactory generation of the Canadian 
economy: 
In the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire 
the 1900-1930 period witnessed a rapid development in 
which constitutional and economic advance were closely 
related. But because these economies were initially 
geared to the production of exportable primary produce 
they were peculiarly vulnerable to instability in 
commodity markets. Indeed, in retrospect the situation 
of the Dominion economies after the First World War can 
be seen as inherently fragile, since they were engaged 
in a struggle' to maintain the highlv-expanded agricul- 
tural capacity built up between 191^ and I9I8 just when 
the famous ’scissors’ (the tendency of industrial prices 
to rise more quickly than those of primary products) was 
becoming pronounced.9 
p. 279. 
°R.P. Holland, "The End of am Imperial Economy: 
Anglo-Canadian Disengagement in the 1930's”, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 11 (I983) :159"-5o7 
5 
As a result of the fragility of the Canadian economy, Fowke 
recognized that; 
The new national policy, like the old, is concerned 
with agriculture, hut to quite a different degree and 
in quite a different way. . . . Without detailed analy- 
sis it can nevertheless he said that the major differ- 
ences between the agricultural features of the old and 
the new national policies relate to a modification in 
the national view concerning the price system in re- 
lation to the agricultural economy. Price support and 
crop failure legislation had no place in the first 
national policy hut may he regarded as an integral part 
of the second. The first national policy was concerned 
with an agricultural-commercial economy; the second will 
necessarily conform to the requirements of an economy^Q* 
which is becoming increasingly industrial-commercial. 
Although Fowke*s analysis of the national policies 
does not extend into the years of the Second World War, it 
nevertheless indicates that a conscious and consistent effort 
to build a national economy has been underway since the 
early nineteenth century. Although the Canadian economy 
was closely associated with that of the United Kingdom, the 
Canadian government formulated national policies consistent 
with national economic interests. 
Canada’s role in the early stages of the development 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has not been given 
the detailed attention it warrants. Indeed, a critical look 
at the origin of the IMF itself has been lacking as well. 
Considering the extent of American economic involvement in 
the world and considering many Canadians* perception of 
American economic domination, this lack of attention given 
10 Fowke, pp. 285-86. 
6 
to the IMF is striking. The IMF developed out of a desire 
to obviate the financial disorders similar to those felt in 
the wake of World War One. Consequently, the first proposals 
for an international financial organization developed in the 
early years of World War Two. The main purpose behind these 
proposals was to overcome the financial problems that were 
likely to occur in the postwar period. Two proposals that 
were developed, one British and the other American, were 
similar in purpose but very different in character. This 
difference in character was owing to the difference in the 
United Kingdom's and the United States* international trade 
and financial relationships. 
Canada, like many other nations, felt the effects of 
the financial disorder of the interwar period. However, 
unlike many other nations, when proposals were being devel- 
oped in the United Kingdom and the United States, Canada was 
actively involved in wartime and postwar planning. As a 
result, Canadian officials were in a position to affect the 
outcome of the discussions on international finance. In 
part Canadian influence in these discussions was felt when 
a Canadian plan was produced in 19^3 which was similar in 
character to that of the American proposal. Although a 
superficial look at Canada's involvement in these discussions 
might indicate that Canada merely followed the United States* 
lead, a more thorough analysis reveals otherwise. Similar to 
Fowke's analysis of national policy in Canada, Canada's 
7 
position during these discussions was based on Canadian 
experiences that involved international trade and finance 
during the interwar period as well as on wartime changes 
to these experiences. The pages that follow will examine 
the position Canadian officials held during the informal 
discussions that led to the creation of the IMF. It is 
hoped that this study will lead to a better understanding 
of Canadian economic relations during the war as well as 
in the decades following the war. 
CHAPTER I 
THE 1930*ss THE DECLINE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 
By the early twentieth century international trade 
had developed in a complex network. Simple "barter arrange- 
ments had given way to sophisticated multilateral trade 
patterns. The world's financial system had developed in 
ways that would facilitate this international trade. Conse- 
quently, an international monetary system, the gold standard, 
had developed and was widely practiced. However, multilateral 
trade and international finance deteriorated throughout the 
interwar period. As the international monetary system began 
to break down, some nations tried to take refuge in policies 
of economic nationalism. This led to an even greater break- 
down of the international system. The downward spiral of 
these events dragged the world into the depths of depression. 
Canada, which traded extensively with the United States and 
the United Kingdom, was particularly affected by the events 
of the interwar period. 
The decade of the thirties opened on a foreboding 
8 
9 
note for Canada. In 1930 a United States Congressman from 
Oregon, William Hawley, and a United States Senator from 
Utah, Reed Smoot, achieved the successful passage of their 
bill for higher tariffs. For the United States, the Hawley- 
Smoot Tariff meant protection of American domestic producers 
from the competition of foreign goods. For the rest of the 
world, it meant the marketplace for export goods had become 
smaller. Canada, in particular, was extremely vulnerable to 
the American tariff. 
Throughout the 1920*s Canada had an imfavourable 
1 
trade balance with the United States. In 1929 this trade 
imbalance stood at $371»021,000.^ Now, in 193Q» Hawley- 
Smoot Tariff was sure to reduce Cainadian exports to the 
United States and this would make the adverse trade balance 
even worse. However, partly to retaliate against the American 
tariff and partly to allay protectionist, pressures within 
Canada, the newly elected Conservative government led by 
R.B. Bennett also raised tariff rates on many goods entering 
Canada. Restricting imports into Canada in response to 
restrictions on Canadian exports offered only a partial 
solution to Canada's overall balance of payments problem. 
^See Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, 
Canada's Foreign Trade, for the years 192O-I929. 
p 
Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Canada's 
Foreign Trade. Calendar Year 19^,» p. 2. 
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The rationale employed at the time was that a cotmtry's 
international payments could be brought into equilibrium by 
effecting a balance in foreign trade. Because the importation 
of goods and services was a contributory factor to a nation's 
adverse balance of payments, it^ was believed that by decreas- 
ing imports a balance in international payments could be 
achieved. This was a deceptively easy method of balancing 
international payments and one enthusiastically supported by 
domestic industries that competed with foreign goods. It 
was, for these reasons, a very attractive policy for a govern- 
ment to pursue. However, when placed within a global context, 
as all international trade and finance policies must, this 
method of balancing the international payments proved to be 
not only short-sighted but also disastrous. If Canada alone 
had been faced with international payments difficulties, then 
it would have been conceivable that other nations could have 
absorbed the effect of a decreased market in Canada. As we 
know, Canada was far from being alone in experiencing these 
difficulties nor was she alone in pursuing the type of policy 
outlined above. Consequently, the world's marketplaces 
decreased and this created even more havoc for countries like 
Canada which were dependent on foreign trade. 
The need for additional outlets for Canadian producers 
became even more critical because of the tendency throughout 
the 1930's for export prices to decrease relative to import 
prices. In a study on the Canadian economy of the 1930's, 
11 
A.E. Safarian states, "as compared with the period 1926 to 
1929, it was necessary in the years 1930 to 193^ "to export 
3 to 1^ per cent more in volume of exports for one volume of 
imports."^ Consequently, maintaining a relatively stable 
level of economic activity within Canada required that the 
Canadian government find a larger export market than had 
existed before the United States tariff. 
Caught in an increasingly difficult predicament, 
Canada turned to the Mother coimtry and the Empire. At the 
Imperial Conference of 1930 "fc^e Canadian Prime Minister, 
R.B. Bennett, asserted that, "the Conservative party of 
Canada believes in, and employs, the principle of protection 
of the home producer of agricultural and fabricated products 
l± 
from harmful interference by world competition." However, 
this assertion did not preclude the Prime Minister from press- 
ing for a policy that would extend the preference for Empire 
goods.^ In essence, Bennett was attempting to find new 
^A.E. Safarian, "Foreign Trade and the Level of 
Economic Activity in Canada in the 1930*s", Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science 18 (August 1952)038. 
L 
Extracts from Minutes of Imperial Conference 1930, 
2nd Plenary Session, 8 October 1930» in Alex I. Inglis (ed.), 
Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 4, (Hull: 
Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1971), (hereafter 
Dociiments. vol. 4), Doc. 1?4, p. 22?. 
^Ibid. 
12 
markets for Canadian producers but not to open domestic 
producers to foreign competition. Although this attempt at 
extending the Imperial preference failed for the moment, it 
laid the foundations for the Ottawa Conference of 1932. 
At the Ottawa Conference, Imperial preferences were 
discussed at great length. Although the United Kingdom was 
reluctant to increase the existing Imperial preferences, the 
British finally acquiesced. For Canada, the most important 
document to come out of this Conference was the Anglo-Canadian 
Agreement. The main British exports which were guaranteed a 
tariff rate below that for other foreign goods entering Canada 
were chemicals, textiles, primary iron and steel goods, and 
anthracite coal.^ In return, certain Canadian exports which 
were assured free entry into Britain included lumber, apples 
and bacon. Although preferential treatment was also extended 
to many Canadian agricultural products including wheat, exports 
of these goods did not increase because of competition from 
other Commonwealth countries which were also granted prefer- 
ential entry into the British market.T 
Although Canada secured a major concession from the 
United Kingdom in the Anglo-Canadian Agreement of 1932, 
forces were already at work to undermine it. Owing to tremen- 
dous pressures on her monetary reserves, Britain had been 
John A. Stovel, Canada in the World Economy. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959)» p. 22?. 
13 
forced to abandon the gold standard in September 1931* The 
pound sterling no longer maintained a gold parity and subse- 
quently fell in value relative to the- American and Canadian 
Q 
dollars. As a result of the appreciation of the Canadian 
dollar relative to sterling, Canadian exports to the United 
Kingdom were at a disadvantage compared to those countries 
which used sterling. Because of the Canadian dollar’s 
appreciation relative to sterling, British imports into 
Canada were in an advantageous position in comparison with 
Canadian domestic producers. Apart from the effect this had 
on Canadian industry, it compounded Canada’s balance of pay- 
ments problems. As a result of the increase in imports from 
the United Kingdom and a decrease in exports to the United 
Kingdom, Canada’s net favourable balance with the United 
Kingdom declined from earlier levels. That is, there was a 
smaller favourable trade balance with the United Kingdom to 
offset the unfavourable trade balance with the United States. 
Since sterling also depreciated relative to the United States 
dollar, more sterling was required to pay off debts in the 
United States after 1932 as compared to 1930* 
When sterling was removed from the gold standard in 
1931» the Canadian authorities could have followed the 
British lead by attaching the Canadian dollar to sterling. 
Although the Cana.dian authorities pondered this option, there 
g 
See Susan Howson, ’’The Management of Sterling, 1932- 
1939”» The Journal of Economic History 60 (March 1980):5^. 
was no doubt which way they would go. Had the Canadian 
dollar followed sterling, Canada’s competitive position with 
other sterling countries would have remained unchanged. 
However, Canada's indebtedness to the United States would 
have become completely unmanageable. If the Canadian dollar 
had followed sterling, it too would have depreciated relative 
to the United States dollar. As a result, more Canadian 
dollars would have been required to service debts owed to the 
United States. Moreover, United States goods imported into 
Canada would decrease because they would be more expensive. 
Many of these goods were essential to Canadian industry. In 
fact, the Deputy Minister of Finance, W.C. Clark, raised this 
point with Bennett when he asked, "in view of our trade and 
debt relationship with the United States, would it be wiser 
national policy for Canada to tie up with gold standard New 
York than with London?”^ In a much later correspondence 
with an executive of the Bank of Montreal, Bennett revealed 
his response, "I find it difficult to ■understand how men of 
intelligence knowing the extent of our financial obligations 
to the United States, can even suggest the possibility of 
our coming within the sterling area imtil we have paid off 
%.C. Clark to R.B. Bennett, 28 March 1932, quoted 
from Ian M. Drummond, The Floating Poimd and the Sterling 
Area. 1931-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
I9S1), p. 66. 
15 
these ohligations. 
One effective method of "paying off” the financial 
obligation to the United States would be to secure better 
trade arrangements. Fortunately for Canada, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was elected President of the United States in 
1932* Although the Roosevelt administration did not immedi- 
ately pursue less restrictive trade practices, Canadian 
officials saw signs of hope. In April 1933 the Canadian 
minister in the United States, W.D. Herridge,^^ reported 
that Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized that " . 
the postwar policy of the United States has contributed 
greatly to the development of economic nationalization all 
over the world, and that a grave responsibility rests on the 
present Administration to work for the reversal of thei 
12 
current. ” Even though there was a. ray of hope shining 
from the United States, Canadian authorities were well aware 
^R.B. Bennett to H.F. Skeg, 27 January 1933# quoted 
from Ian M.. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling 
Area. 1931-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
I9S1), p. 68. 
^^J.B. Brebner, an historian, made the following 
comment on Herridge's relationships with American officials, 
” . . . the Roosevelt Administration treated the Canadian 
minister at Washington, Mr. W.D, Herridge, almost as one of 
the official family. They tried out their ideas on him 
wholesale in return for his understanding North American 
comment", quoted from J.R.H. Wilbur, "Canadian-American 
Trade War during the Great Depression**, International 
Perspectives (March/April 1975):19. 
Herridge to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 10 April 1933# iu Documents. vol, 4, Doc. 227» P* 244. 
16 
of the obstacles still facing them. One such obstacle was 
the Farm Relief Bill which was before Congress in 1933• 
Designed to raise United States domestic prices, the Farm 
Relief Bill would increase tariffs on selected agricultural 
imports. With this diversion from liberalizing international 
trade, Herridge commented that "[the Farm Relief Bill] leads 
one to wonder whether a synthesis of policies has been 
achieved in the highest quarters of the [U.S.] Government. 
In spite of the Roosevelt Administration*s inability 
to follow Hull's policy of freer trade, Canadian officials 
continued to press for better trade relations with the United 
States. Discussions with American officials were pursued 
at high levels by R.K. Finlayson, a member of the Canadian 
Legation in Washington, W.C. Clark, the Deputy Minister of 
Finance, Dana Wilgress, the Director of Commercial Intelli- 
gence for the Department of Trade and Commerce, and Norman 
Robertson, an official of the Department of External Affairs. 
Although no agreements resulted from these discussions, the 
United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir William 
Clark, noted in November 1933 that "during the past month 
signs have not been wanting that Canada is gradually 
being drawn by force of circumstance further within the 
Wilbur, p. 19. 
17 
orbit of the United States National Recovery Administration. 
The United States increasingly viewed foreign trade relations 
as an important part of its National Recovery programme. 
However, strong protectionist forces within the United States 
as well as in many other countries created obstacles to the 
freer trade policies advocated by Hull. Nevertheless, Canada’s 
willingness to negotiate a trade agreement that would increase 
the exports of both countries secured Canada a prominent 
position in the American economic programme. 
In November 193^ the Canadian government informed 
the Americans that they believed " . ► the time has come 
for definite action and that the declared desire of both 
Governments to improve conditions of trade between the two 
countries should now be carried into effect by the negotiation 
of a comprehensive trade agreement.The result of these 
negotiations was the United States-Canadian Trade Agreement 
of 1935* Although these negotiations were initiated by the 
Conservative government, Mackenzie King’s Liberal government 
was in power when the terms of the Agreement were approved by 
^^Sir William Clark to Thomas, l6 November 1933» 
quoted from R.F. Holland, "The End of an Imperial Economy; 
Anglo-Canadian Disengagement in the 1930’s”, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 11 (I983)1X69. 
^^Herridge to Hull, 4 November 193^» in Alex I. 
Inglis (ed.). Documents on Canadian External Relations, 
vol. 5» (Hull; Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 
1973)» (hereafter Documents, vol. 5)» Doc. I70, p. 177• 
18 
Order in Council.This Agreement increased American 
markets for Canadian lumber, cattle, fish, whisky and 
potatoes. In return, the United States received concessions 
on farm implements, electrical apparatus, gasoline and 
machinery. In a report to Prime Minister King in 193^, 
Herbert M. Marler, Canadian Minister in the United States, 
indicated that Canadian exports to the United States had not 
only increased but had increased faster than the increase of 
American imports flowing into Canada. During the first nine 
months of I936, Canadian exports to the United States rose by 
$58 million while American exports to Canada increased by only 
$33 million.Although Marler had noted rightly that at 
least some of the increase in Canadian exports to the United 
States could be attributed to an unusual demand for wheat in 
the United States, there was little doubt in the minds of 
the Canadian officials that the Canadian-American Trade 
Agreement was beneficial to Canada. 
Although the Canadian government had no misgivings 
20 
when it entered into this Agreement with the United States, 
^"^Order in Co-uncil, P.C. 35511 11 November 1935> iJ^ 
Documents, vol. 5« 
^^Stovel, p. 228. 
^%inister in the United States to the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, 28 November 193^» in Documents, 
vol. 6, Doc. 441, p. 589. 
20 See Herridge to Hull, 4 November 193^» In Documents, 
vol. 5, Doc, 170, p. 182. 
19 
the British government frowned upon the Canadian-American 
accord. In correspondence with the High Commissioner in 
Britain, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
O.D. Skelton, noted that 
. . . His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
have watched with a certain restiveness the negotiation 
of the Trade Agreement between Canada and the United 
States of America . . . They appear to have expected 
that consideration of Canadian trade relations with 
the United Kingdom would take precedence over other 
and more pressing aspects of this country's economic 
relations with the rest of the world.21 
Even though Canada was attempting to open up more markets 
for her producers, the United Kingdom government was 
justified in. feeling inj\ired. The Ottawa Agreement gave 
certain Canadian products preferential access into the 
British market. In retiirn, certain British exports received 
preferential treatment in Canada. However, when the United 
States-Canada Trade Agreement was signed, some of these 
British exports were placed at the same tairiff level as 
American goods. Preferential treatment that had been ex- 
tended to some British exports was discontinued. 
Although there was a certain degree of continuity in 
the Liberal and Conservative trade policies, it is worth 
noting their differences. The Bennett government's use of 
protective tariffs, development of Imperial preference, and 
21 O.D. Skelton to High Commissioner in Great Britain, 
16 May 193^» in John A. Munro (ed.). Documents on Canadian 
External Relations, vol. 6, (Hull: Minister of Supply and 
Services, Canada, 1973)» (hereafter Documents, vol. 6), 
Doc. 255, P. 328. 
20 
negotiation of the Canadian-American Trade Agreement all 
served a narrow, self-interested purpose. This purpose was 
to protect Canadian producers from foreign competition while 
increasing Canada's export market. This form of economic 
nationalism excluded consideration of the larger international 
framework. However, Bennett defended his government's policy 
by drawing attention to the global economic environment in 
which Canada had to operate; 
Is there any one within the sound of my voice to-night 
who does not know that had we not taken the action we 
did in 1930 we would not now be in a position to negoti- 
ate with our great neighbour? Everybody knows that this 
is so, and what is more, had we not done it, we could 
not have remained a solvent people.22 
Bennett may have been right in suggesting that, under the 
circtimstances, their policy prevented Canada's economic 
collapse. However, the Liberals saw the Conservative policy 
im a different light. Early in 193^ Prime Minister King 
enunciated his economic policy; 
We on this side of the house believe that recovery is 
bo\md up with the restoration of international trade. 
Our policies have been based upon this conviction and 
have sought to secure, on the basis of reciprocity, 
the reduction of tariffs and the removal of restrictions 
which have choked and encumbered our trade with the 
world.23 
22 Canada. Parliament, House of Commons, Debates. 1935* 
vol. 1, 21 January 1935* P* 
^^Canada. Parliament, House of Commons, Debates. 1937* 
vol. 1, W.L.M. King, "The Address", 18 January 1937, p. 46. 
21 
The Liberal government was aware of the need to free trade 
from the restrictive policies strangling it and was prepared 
to take advantage of the opportimity that arose. 
In early 1937 the United States government attempted 
to persuade the British government to negotiate a trade 
agreement but the British were reluctant to assent to this 
overt^lre. The Empire, or perhaps more definitively the 
Sterling area, had become an important factor in the 
oil 
prosperity of the United Kingdom during the 1930*s* Never- 
theless, in response to the American overture, the President 
of the British Board of Trade, Walter Rimciman reportedly 
claimed that Britain . . would be glad to enter into a 
comprehensive trade agreement with the United States if it 
were not for the insistence of the Dominions in general and 
of Canada in particular on the maintenance of their preferen- 
tial position in the United Kingdom market.Richard N. 
Kottman’s interpretation of Runciman's claim is that, 
. . . the British had made no great effort at London to 
satisfy the Dominions or even to inform them of what 
compensation Whitehall would grant for their compliance. 
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In 1938 the United Kingdom was sending forty- 
seven percent of her exports to Empire countries. By compar- 
ison, in 1913 the percenta.ge was only twenty-two percent. See 
Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire. 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 18. 
?%erbert M. Marler (Minister in the United States) 
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 February 1937, 
in Documents. vol. 6, Doc. 444, p. 576. 
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The easier route, and the one adopted by a government 
only lukewarm about a trade agreement, was to saddle 
the Dominions with the responsibility for inaction.26 
Kottman has missed the significance of Whitehall's failure 
to present, the Dominions with compensation for abandoning 
imperial preference. The United Kingdom, not the Dominions, 
stood to lose the most if the United States negotiated 
separate agreements with each of the Dominions. Nearly half 
of the United Kingdom's total exports, most of which were 
manufactured goods, went to Empire countries. The United 
States, also an exporter of manufactured goods, could displace 
British exports if given the opportunity. 
Although the United Kingdom market was vital to 
Canada, it was inconceivable that Canadian officials would 
obstruct the negotiation of a multilateral trade agreement 
between her two most important trade partners. As a result 
of Runciman's discussion with the Americans, Herbert M. 
Marler, the Minister in Washington, observed that 
. . .Mr. Hull and his advisers are coming to regard 
Canada as the obstacle to what they look upon as a 
vitally important step in economic disarmament. ... If 
this impression has in fact been left, as I fear it has, 
it will be necessary to eradicate it before the question 
can be sucessfully taken up of the renewal and extension 
of the Trade Agreement between Canada and the United 
States.2? 
^^Richard N. Kottman, Reciurocitv and the North 
Atlantic Triangle. 19^2-1938. (Ithaca, NW York; Cornell 
University Press, I900), p.l84. 
^"^Herbert M. Marler to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 5 February 1937, in Documents, vol. 6, Doc. 444, 
PP. 576-7. 
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In response to Marler’s observation, Skelton wrote a 
lengthy dissertation on Canada's position on matters of 
international economic policy. In this dissertation Skelton 
stated that ", . . the Canadian Government have insisted on 
the progressive liberalization of the preferential system and 
have endeavoured to apply within that system the principles 
of commercial policy which they hope to see realized in 
2& international economic relations." As it became increasingly 
apparent that some of the Dominions desired bilateral negoti- 
ations with the United States, the British position became 
clearer. When negotiations finally took place in 1938» it 
was the British government that insisted on including ". 
Newfoundland and the Colonies in the proposed agreement 
between the United States and the United Kingdom and not to 
conclude separate agreements thereof*The significance of 
including the Colonies in an Anglo-American trade agreement 
was made clear when the American Ambassador in the United 
Kingdom, Joseph P. Kennedy, reported that "... J.M. Keynes, 
Skelton to Minister in United States, 18 
February 1937» in Documents, vol. 6, Doc. 444, p. 578. 
^%emorandum of a conversation with Hawkins, Deimel, 
and Carr of the State Department; Fox, Mark Smith, and Lane 
of the Tariff Commission and Chalkley and Leach of the 
British Embassy, by Robert M. Carr, 2 January 1938, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers. 
1938, vol. 2, The British Commonwealth, Europe. Near East 
and Africa. (Washingtons United States Government Printing 
Office, 1955)» P-1. 
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the economist, in a letter to the Times today pointing out 
the had trade balances, says that it is becoming more and 
more apparent that England should only buy where they can 
sell and that barter doubtless must be considered strongly 
by the Government.In financial difficulties, the United 
Kingdom needed a secure export market. British economistsi 
particularly Keynes, saw expansion of export trade as a 
necessity in solving the balance of payments difficulties 
and reducing the high rate of unemployment which had plagued 
Britain throughout the interwar period. In the letter referred 
to by Kennedy, Keynes clearly stated how attractive barter 
was for Britain: 
In the circumstances of the moment I suggest that the 
balance-of-trade position and the net disinvestment in 
this country's foreign accounts which is probably going 
on (about which we have, as usual, ho adequate statistics) 
also needs particular attention - not, indeed, by an 
aggravation of tauriffs but by a new, auid now necessary 
machinery for linking up exports with imports, so as to 
make stire that those from whom we buy spend a reasonable 
proportion of the proceeds in corresponding purchases 
from us.31 
Keynes understood, as few economists did, the important 
^^Kennedy to Cordell Hull, 7 October 1938• Foreign 
Relations, vol. 2, pp. 59-^0* 
^%eynes to the editor of The Times. 5 October 1938, 
in Donald E. Moggridge (ed,), The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, vol. 21, Activities. 1931 to 1939; World 
Crises and Policies in Britain and ^erica. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, I979), (hereafter Collected 
Writings, vol. 21), p. 483. 
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relationship that existed between balancing individual 
nations* foreign trade and expanding world trade. To ensure 
that a balance in exports and imports was established, Britain 
turned to those countries on whom she had the greatest 
influence. The coimtries in question were usually either 
countries belonging to the Empire or coimtries which were 
following sterling. However, should the United States negoti- 
ate trade agreements with these countries, British officials 
would be less able to balance its exports and imports. Conse- 
quently, the British were extremely reluctant to allow the 
United States to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with 
these co\mtries. American officials, however, perceived the. 
British position as an obstacle to their objective of promoting 
the expansion of world trade. 
Britain's trade policy was incompatible with the 
vision many Canadian officials had of promoting greater 
international trade. In his defence of the trade agreement 
with the United States delivered in the House of Commons 
early in 1936, King enunciated the virtues of imrestricted 
international trade; 
During these last few years the different countries of 
the world have been going mad through basing their actions 
on a fake doctrine of economic nationalism, through 
having nothing to do with their neighbours, regarding 
trade as a species of warfare, instead of a matter of 
mutual interest. ... I believe we will live to see 
the day when this agreement between the United States 
and Canada, will be held up as marking a new beginning 
in the relations between the coimtries of the world; a 
new beginning in the direction of more in the way of 
trade and of international friendship; and of less in 
the way of those things that make for ill in the world 
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at large. 
Few would now argue that economic nationalist policies which 
decreased the volume and value of international trade were 
destructive to virtually every nation. However, King, as 
with many other world leaders, did not recognize that the 
policies advocated hy Keynes were not simply economic nation- 
alism. The type of barter arrangements put forward by Keynes 
was an economic necessity for Britain to continue its active 
participation in world trade. 
The ideal of marking a *new beginning* with the 
objective of bettering the world was a noble endeavour. 
However, the fact that this endeavour was also the most 
direct route to Canadian prosperity should not be overlooked. 
The Canadian economy was more dependent upon external trade 
than that of most nations. The importance of exports in the 
Canadian economy as a whole was obvious in the fact that in 
1939 Chadian export trade represented almost $100 per capita. 
By comparison, American export trade represented only $25 
per capita.Moreover, even though Canada was blessed with 
many raw resources, much of the nation's industries relied 
^^Canada. Parliament, House of Commons, Debates. 
1936, vol. 1, W.L.M. King, 11 February 1936, p. 92. 
^^A.K. Harvie, "Financing Canada's International 
Trade", in J.F. Parkinson (ed.), Canadian Investment and 
Foreign Exchange Problems. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 19^0), p. 35. 
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heavily on imports. In a study prepared for the League of 
Nations* General Study Conference on Economic Policies in 
Relation to World Peace, J.F. Parkinson had eniomerated the 
deficiencies inherent in the Canadian economy; 
• . . this coxmtry is almost totally deficient in certain 
natural resources, and incapable of producing other 
commodities which are indispensable to the maintenance 
of an industrial society and a western standard of 
living. The principal industrial shortages are fuels, 
iron, rubber, textile materials (cotton, wool, silk) 
while all foodstuffs of a tropical or semi-tropical 
character are lacking.3^ 
Throughout the latter half of the thirties Canadian imports 
of those commodities that were required by Canadian industries 
represented approximately one~third of Canada’s total 
imports.While American goods represented the bulk of 
imports into Canada (6l^ in 1938)» only about 39^ of Canadian 
exports went to the United States. The bulk of Cainadisui 
exports were sold to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the 
British and American markets were crucial to the Canadian 
economy. Policies which kept these two markets open to 
Canadian trade were foremost in the minds of the Cainadian 
officials. 
^^J.P. Parkinson, ”The Basis of Canadian Commercial 
Policy, 1926-1938", (Paris: League of Nations, 1939)» P- 77* 
^^Of the imported commodities used for Canadian 
industry for the years 1935-1938* approximately 51?^ were 
classified imder raw materials, approximately 21^ were 
semi-manufactured, and approximately 28^ were fully manu- 
factured. See Canada. Department of Trade and Commerce. 
Canada’s Foreign Trade. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EARLY 19^0’sr THE RISE OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
During the first couple of years of war, Canada 
made a very significant contribution to the war effort. 
Virtually every facet of Canadian society and economic 
structure became oriented towards winning the war. Not 
the least of these efforts was the re-focussing of peace- 
time industries into suppliers of war materiel. As impor- 
tant as these contributions were in themselves, they were 
all the more important by the fact that the United States 
provided only minimal supplies to the allies and showed few 
signs of stepping up production. As a result, Canadian 
officials were anxious to integrate the tremendous productive 
capacity of their southern neighbour into the overall war 
effort. In a study of this aspect of the Canadian-American 
relationship, R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein have written; 
the Canadian aim in these critical months of 1940 and 
1941 had been to bind the Dominion to the United States. 
In part this was a plain and simple desire for the 
protection that could be afforded by the American 
Government. Part, too, was a clear desire to involve 
the United States more closely with a belligerent, to 
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tie America and the Commonwealth closer together.^ 
However, there was a more basic motive behind the desire to 
align the Canadian economy with that of the United States. 
The United Kingdom's adverse balance of payments with Canada 
from 15 September 1939 to 3I March 19^1 was calculated to be 
$79^»500*000 (Can).^ For the same period Canada's adverse 
balance of payments with the United States was estimated to 
be $430,000,000 (U.S.).^ Normally, as in the interwar period, 
Canada would have been able to meet this latter deficit by 
selling surplus sterling in New York in exchange for American 
dollars. However, this exchange market had not been available 
to Canada since the outbreak of the war. 
By Order in Council on I5 September 1939» Canadian 
control of the movement of capital was given to the Foreign 
Exchange Control Board. The purpose of this control on 
capital was explained by the Minister of Finaince, J.L. Ralston, 
R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein. Ties That Bind; 
Canadian-American Relations from the Great War to the Cold 
War. (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Co., I977), p.99. 
^W.C. Clark, "Canada's Exchange Position Vis-a-Vis 
the United Kingdom", n.d. April 1941, in David R. Murray, 
Documents on Canadian External Relations. 1939-1941. vol. 
8, pt. 2, (Hull: Minister of Supply and Services,Canada, 
1976), (hereafter Documents. vol. 8, pt. 2), Doc, 188, p. 310» 
^W.C. Clark, "Canada's Exchange Deficit with the 
United States", n.d. April 1941, Ibid., p. 312. 
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in his budget speech of 1940: 
At this time . . . when Britain has such vital need of 
gold and US dollars to purchase planes and other war 
equipment, we cannot expect her to settle all her trade 
balance with us in gold or foreign exchange . . . Conse- 
quently, ... a very large proportion of the surplus 
sterling exchange which we obtain and which formerly we 
were able to convert into US dollars in order to meet 
any adverse balance of payments with that country can 
no longer be so converted.^ 
As a result, Canada had the two-fold problem of financing 
Britain's deficit on the one hand and meeting her own 
deficit with the United States on the other. To finance the 
United Kingdom deficit (less $249,800,000 (Can), the amount 
of gold trsinsferred to Canada from the United Kingdom during 
this period), Canada repatriated securities ($33^,700,000 
(Can)) and accumulated sterling ($208,000,000 (Can)).-^ To 
meet her own deficit with the United States Canada transferred 
most of the gold received from the United Kingdom ($227,100, 
000 (U.S.)) and used up her United States dollar reserves 
($236,600,000 (U.S.)), Canada also liquidated American 
assets to a total of $70,3000,000 (U.S.). 
4 Canada. Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 
vol. 2, 1940, J.L. Ralston, "The Budget”, 24 June 19^0, 
pp. 1015-16. 
%.C. Clark, "Canada's Exchange Position Vis-a-Vis 
the United Kingdom", in David R. Murray, Documents on Canadian 
External Relations, vol. 8, pt. 2, (Hull: Minister of Supply 
and Services, Canada, 1976), (hereafter Documents, vol. 8, 
pt. 2), pp. 3IO-II. 
^W.C. Clark, "Canada's Exchange Deficit with the 
United States", Ibid., p. 312. 
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Although Canada had thus met the exchange difficulties 
that she faced during the first year of war, the prospects 
for continuing to do so were extremely dim. In early December 
19^0, Britain restricted gold transfers to Canada because she 
was required to send gold to the United States to meet her 
obligations there. As a result, in the last four months of 
the period under discussion, Canada was obliged to meet the 
bulk of her deficit with the United States solely with 
American assets.^ As her deficit with the United States 
had usually been met from the trade surplus with the United 
Kingdom, this was an incredibly heavy burden on Canada's 
balaince of international payments. The deficit predicted for 
the 19^1 fiscal year indicated that the coming year was going 
to be even more difficult. The United Kingdom's projected 
deficit with Canada was estimated at $1,152,000,000 (Can) 
while Canada’s deficit with the United States was expected to 
reach $478,000,000 (U.S.).® 
Canada's ability to overcome this formidable problem 
was crucial to continuation of her valuable contribution to 
the war effort but it also had important implications for 
Canada in the postwar period. Since Canada's gold and United 
'^Ibid., pp. 312-13. 
Q 
W.C. Clark, "Canada’s Exchange Position Vis-a-Vis 
the United Kingdom", Ibid., p. 310; and Clark, "Canada's 
Exchange Deficit with the United States", Ibid., p. 3H* 
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States dollar reserves stood at only $312,000^000 as of 
28 February 19^1, her American assets could not withstand 
the projected deficit. Some other method would have to be 
found to cover the deficit with the United States, Just 
prior to W.L. Mackenzie King's historic trip to Hyde Park 
in April 19^1# W.C. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, 
enumerated five methods that could be used to meet this 
balance of payments problems 1) to liquidate United States 
securities held by Canadians, 2) to have the United States 
component of British purchases in Canada fall \mder the 
Lease-Lend Agreement, 3) io increase United States purchases 
in Canada, 4) to require Britain to use some of its gold and 
United States dollar reserves for Canadian purchases, and 
5) to have Canada come \mder the Lease-Lend Agreement for 
its purchases in the United States. Apart from the first 
option, these methods all implied that a mutual agreement 
would have to be reached with the United States. The first 
and the last options were related in that it was believed 
that the United States would seek liquidation of Canadian 
investments in the United States before it would allow 
Canada to take advantage of the Lease-Lend Agreement. 
Clark, while prepared to liquidate such assets, argued 
strongly against such a programme. He claimed that Canadian 
investments in foreign countries, especially the United 
States, provided Canada with a cushion when the value of 
Canadian exports declined temporarily. It was Clark's con- 
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tention that, because Canada's exports consisted predom- 
inantly of raw resources and foodstuffs, the prices of which 
tended to drop quicker in times of depression than those of 
manufactured goods, and since the former represented the bulk 
of Csinadian exports, and the latter covered the bulk of 
Canadian imports, an additional strain was put on Canada's 
balance of payments. As a result, Clark argued; 
It is obvious that if Canada is forced to liquidate her 
U.S. securities. United States exports to Canada after 
the war must decline, not only as compared with the war 
years but as compared with the pre-war years. . . . Not 
only will her imports from the United States decline for 
this reason but the protectionist forces in Canada will 
find as a result of our balance of payments difficulties 
an additional and very strong argument for promoting 
their particular doctrines. It is not difficult to vis- 
ualize a situation where the high tariff advocates will 
be in the ascendent, not only in the field of manufactured 
products but in that of agricultural products as well. 
As a result, the trade agreements program and all the 
fine work which has been achieved in recent years in 
promoting a more enlightened attitude in the trading 
relations of our two coxmtries will be undermined or 
perhaps scrapped altogether.^ 
Clark was concerned about the war effort, and thus sought 
ways to permit Canada to continue the supply of goods to 
Britain. However, he was also keenly aware of the potential 
consequences this supply could have on the Canadian economy 
after the war. Clark's concern about the sale of United 
States securities underscored the extent to which the 
American and Canadian economies had become interwoven. 
%.C. Clark, "Should Canada be Forced to Liquidate 
Her Holdings of United States Securities", n.d. April 19^1, 
Documents, vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. 188, p. 318* 
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It has 136001116 commonplac6 to focus attention on the 
extent of American investment in Canada and its effect on 
the Canadian economy. However, with the experience in the 
interwar years of declining trade levels still fresh in the 
minds of many Canadians, the loss of Canadian investment in 
the United States was not looked upon with favour. The 
experience of the interwar period enlightened many economists 
on’ the disastrous effects of curtailing imports as a means 
of correcting an imbalance in international payments. As 
stated in the preceding chapter, restricting imports had the 
short-term benefit of working towards a balance in internation- 
al payments. However, this was only a temporary benefit 
because sooner or later exports would also diminish. The 
loss of Canadian investments in the United States would 
affect Canada’s ability to pay for imports from the United 
States. The .loss of Canadian markets would force the United 
States to restrict Canadian exports to the United States. 
Since the United States was Canada’s largest trade partner, 
the effect on the Canadian economy would be felt almost 
immediately. Consequently, the burden of war threatened to 
destroy Canada’s trade relationships and demanded immediate 
action to prevent this from occurring. 
In Granatstein’s account of Canada’s balance of pay- 
ments difficulties during the first two years of war he 
claims; 
Morgenthau was not too accommodating. When Canadian 
officials saw him again on March l8 and I9 he told 
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them if there were exchange problems Canada should 
begin to liquidate her securities. As for the 
question of bringing the British components of Canadian 
imports Tmder Lend-Lease, that was a matter for Harry 
Hopkins to decide. 
However, when Prime Minister King arrived in Washington in 
raid-April, he presented Morgenthau with . . his scheme for 
a virtual system of barter in war materiel [and] [t]his 
interested the American . .Later, when King met 
with the President, Granatstein describes their conversation 
12 
as 'warm and friendly*. The President made only two 
changes in King's draft of the Hyde Park Agreement, and 
Granatstein claims that ”it had all been incredibly easy. 
Granatstein explains elsewhere that the reason it had been 
"incredibly easy" was ". the willingness of President 
l4 
Roosevelt to receive Mackenzie King and to listen to him." 
This interpretation propagates the legend that King won the 
day through his personal friendship with the President and 
secured a favourable settlement for Canada. As with most 
^^J.L. Granatstein, Canada's Wars The Politics of 
the Mackenzie King Government. 1939-1945. (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1975)» P* 1^0. 
p. 142. 
^^Ibid., p. 143. 
14 
J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff, Ties That Bind; 
Canadian-American Relations in Wartime. From the Great War 
to the Cold War, (Toronto;. Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Co., 
1977), P. 91. 
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legends^ it has a basis in fact but also obscures much 
detail. In a memorandum dated 12 March 19^1, Norman Robertson, 
the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
recounted a meeting between Clark and Morgenthau during the 
preceding week. This memorandum reported that ”Mr. Morgenthau 
himself, when he thought about the effect on the depressed 
American stock market of the enforced liquidation of Canadian 
holdings of United States securities, was not as explicit as 
his advisors had been in insisting on the mobilization of 
Canadian holdings of United States securities,A few 
weeks later, after a meeting with Morgenthau on 18 April 
19^1 at which W.C. Clark, J.E. Coyne and H.D. White were 
present, the financial attache of the Canadian legation in 
Washington, J.E. Coyne, reported: 
Morgenthau said that he had told the Prime Minister 
of his suggestion that the exchange position could 
be helped through the United States buying munitions 
in Canada. He had told this idea to the President, 
who liked it. (It was quite evident that the whole 
matter had come up, perhaps in very general terms, at 
a [US]cabinet meeting). 
That this bears striking resemblance to Clark’s preferred 
handling of Canada’s balance of payments difficulties was no 
Memorandum from Norman Robertson, Acting-Under- 
secretary of State for External Affairs to the Prime 
Minister, "Canada and Lease-Lend”, 12 March 19^1» in 
Documents, vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. I8l, p. 290. 
l6 
Memorandum by Financial Attache, Legation in United 
States, "Memorandum of Meeting with Morgenthau, April 18, 
1941", 18 April 1941, in Documents, vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. I89, 
p. 321. 
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coincidence. During the weeks intervening between 12 March 
and 17 April, Clark had been in contact with Morgenthau. 
Although there is no record of the conversation, it is 
likely that Clark put forward arguments similar to those he 
sent to the Prime Minister. However, since Morgenthau had 
earlier expressed some misgivings about the liquidation of 
Canadian-held United States securities, it was probably not 
difficult for Clark to convince the Secretary of the 
Treasury not to press for this liquidation. Rather than 
forcing Canada to liquidate her United States securities, 
Morgenthau and the President realized the benefits that 
could be derived from American purchases in Canada. The 
fact that the American leaders had come to this realization 
before the Prime Minister's historic trip to Hyde Park 
suggests that the Hyde Park Agreement had less to do with 
17 personal relationships than with practical economic sense. ' 
Faced with many difficulties arising out of the close 
integration of the Canadian and American economies, the 
Canadian government had transmitted an aide-memoire to the 
State Department on I7 March 19^1, containing the suggestion 
^*^At King's request Clark produced the draft state- 
ment that provided the . basis for discussion with the 
President of what might be given out”. The Mackenzie King 
Diaries. 1932-19^9. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1930); 
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l8 that Joint Economic Committees be established. Initially 
the primary purpose of these Committees was to study and 
submit recommendations to their respective governments on 
how best to integrate the two war economies so that an 
efficient supply line to Europe could be attained. However, 
this was not the only pwpose of the Committees. A secondary 
motive revealed the importance that the Canadian government 
attached to the economic consequences that would be manifest 
in the postwar period: 
. . . the solution of the problem which will arise 
d^iring the months of the transition from war to peace, 
and provision for meeting the economic and social 
problems which are likely to arise in the postwar period, 
require that immediate and detailed study be given to 
this problem.19 
Indeed, it was this concern for the postwar period rather 
than about the efficiency of war production that led to the 
eventual formation of the Joint Economic Committees. Although 
there was every indication that the United States would be 
very receptive to the ideas of these Joint Economic Commit- 
18 Granatstein states that the Joint Economic Commit- 
tees ”... was a Canadian initiative toward closer integrat- 
tion of the North American economy”, in J.L. Granatstein, 
"Getting on With the Americans: Changing Canadian Perceptions 
of the United States, 1939-19^5”» in The Canadian Review of 
American Studies 5 (Spring 197^^):9» 
^^Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), RGI9, 
vol. 3977» file E-3-2, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain, 21 March 19^1. 
39 
tees' ensuring the efficient integration of the two 
20 
economies, it was not until the first week of June 1941 
that the United States formally agreed to the Canadian 
proposal. 
The timing of the United States acceptance of the 
Canadian proposal was important. Various joint bodies had 
already come into existence, which meant that the original 
purpose for the formation of the Joint Economic Committees 
had been satisfied. The American response to the Canadian 
suggestion acknowledged this fact: 
The Government of the United States agrees with the 
Canadian Government that present channels of communi- 
cation between Ottawa and Washington would not provide 
adequate facilities for detailed consideration of certain 
of the subjects present in the Aide Memoire of March 
l?th under reference, as further developed by the 
Memorandum on Economic Cooperation with the United States 
attached thereto. Developments occurring subsequent to 
the date of that note have, however, taken care of 
certain of the problems dealt with in the note under 
reference. More especially, direct contact has already 
been established between the officials of the Government 
of the United States and the Government of Canada 
charged with priorities, and with production of war 
material ... It is not considered desirable to entrust 
to the proposed Committees jurisdiction over these 
specific contacts already established, except as the 
Committees may from time to time, from their knowledge 
of the situation, feel it desirable to make recommen- 
dations. 21 
In so far as the Joint Economic Committees, was not well 
20 See Secretary of State for External Affairs to 
Minister in the United States, 28 April 19^1* in 
Dociiments. vol. 8, pt. 1. Doc. 201, pp.335-36. 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3977, file E-3-2, Department 
of state to Canadian Legation in Washington, 5 June 1941. 
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utilized for the integration of the war economies of the two 
nations, Granatstein is justified in claiming that ”the 
Joint Economic Committees were an abortive Canadian effort 
22 
at co-operation and integration.” However, the primary 
purpose of the Committees had been changed to explore the 
\ 
economic problems of the postwar era. Further evidence 
that the United States intended to redirect the orientation 
of the Committees was attested by the personnel chosen to 
sit on the American section. The Americans selected were; 
William L. Blatt, Deputy Director of the Production Division 
of the Office of Production Management; E. Dana Durand, 
member of the United States Tariff Commission; Harry Dexter 
White, Director of Monetary Research in the Treasury Depart- 
ment; A.H. Hansen, attached to the Staff of the Federal 
Reserve Board; A.A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State who 
was granted the right to sit with the Committees from time 
to time, and L.D. Stinebauer, who was on the staff of the 
Economic Advisor to the Secretary of State and was to act 
as liaison officer to the Secretary of State.As we will 
see later, three of the six named, Berle, Hansen, and White, 
became extensively involved in postwar economic planning. 
As for Canada, officials had no illusions as to the 
changed character of the Joint Economic Committees. In his 
22 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War, p. l47. 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3977» file E-3-2, Department of 
State to Canadian Legation in Washington, 5 June 1941. 
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covering telegram announcing the American acceptance of the 
Canadian proposal, the Minister Counsellor at the Canadian 
Legation in Washington, Hume Wrong, noted that the main 
points of the American reply were **. . . first, a cordial 
acceptance of the proposal; secondly, the suggested modifi- 
cation of the terms of enquiry in view of the developments 
which have taken place since the Canadian proposal was 
24 
advanced. .As a result, the Canadian memhers were 
chosen with these changed 'terms of enquiry* in mind.^^ The 
Canadian section of the Committees consisted of R.A.C. -Henry, 
Economic Adviser to the Minister of Munitions and Supply; 
J.G. Boucard, Assistant Deputy Minister of Agriculture; W.A, 
Mackintosh, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of 
Finance; D.A. Skelton, Chief of the Research Department, 
Bank of Canada; H.L. Keenleyside, a memher of External Affairs 
who was granted the same privileges as Berle; and H.F, Angus, 
who acted as liaison officer to the Secretary of State for 
26 
External Affairs. Of these men. Mackintosh and Skelton 
24 
Hume Wrong to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 6 June 1941, in Documents. vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. 203, 
p.337. 
^%orman Robertson to Cabinet War Committee, 
"Economic Co-Operation Between Canada and the United States”, 
n.d. Jtme 1941, in Documents, vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. 204, 
p. 3^1. 
2^ 
Order in Council, 4500, 20 J\me 1941, in Documents, 
vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. 207, pp. 344-45. 
were to be lairgely involved in postwar economic planning and 
Keenleyside and Angus involved to a lesser extent. 
The Joint Economic Committees studied various aspects 
of the postwar economic problems and adopted a resolution 
in December 19^1 which recognized that "the economic problems 
of Canada and the United States in the postwar period cannot 
be considered apart from the conditions which will govern 
world economic activity and the organization of world trade." 
The Joint Economic Committees recommended that the govern- 
ments of Canada and the United States invite the participa- 
tion of other countries, particularly the British, in a 
joint- declaration which stated; 
To achieve a just and durable peace in an economically 
interdependent world, the signatory governments recognize 
their common responsibility to collaborate with one 
another in promoting full employment, increasing produc- 
tion, expanding markets, improving standards of living, 
and fostering social security and economic stability 
throughout the world.28 
To attain these objectives the Committees proposed the 
establishment of an International Stabilization and 
Development Board. This Board^s mandate was to be the pre- 
vention of depression and the checking of inflation in the 
postwar period by achieving stability in exchanges and in 
prices. The Board was also to explore the need for recon- 
struction and development projects in countries or regions 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3977» file E-3-2, "Resolution of 
the Joint Economic Committees of Canada and the United States 
Resolution No. 6, 5 December 1941. 
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where the necessary capital was lacking. Once these needs 
had. "been considered, the Board was "to work out specific and 
concrete plans for the organization of such public inter- 
national agencies or instrumentalities as may he helpful in 
promoting such projects hy credit, investments or commodity 
operations, or hy other means, and in furthering the objec- 
tives set forth in this declaration.Although not as 
detailed, the basic principles of this resolution proved to 
be strikingly similar to White's plan of a Stabilization 
F\md drafted almost six months later. 
Although this resolution was not officially accepted 
by the American or Canadian governments, it did demonstrate 
where their officials were heading in postwar economic plan- 
ning. A< "Report on International Economic Collaboration" 
was drafted by the Canadians John J. Deutsch, Special 
Wartime Assistant to the Under-Secretary of State for Ex- 
ternal Affairs, and O.D. Skelton and the Americans Charles 
P. Kindleberger, who had been named the American Secretary 
for the Joint Economic Committees, and A.H. Hansen, The 
above resolution was largely based on this report which 
defined the policy direction of Canadian and American offi- 
cials. This report assumed Britain would win the war but 
lose a large part of its overseas income. It also recog- 
nized that, in any programme for reconstruction, Britain 
29 Ibid., p. 2. 
would have to import a larger volume of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. The dilemma was how Britain would pay for these 
imports when her overseas income was so devastated. The 
authors of the report saw two alternatives before Britain. 
The first was to pursue a policy of 'national autarky and 
bilateralism *; the second consis ted of the . re-estab- 
lishment of a functioning world economy, with expanding 
multilateral trade, by deliberate and effective international 
collaboration as a means of increasing productivity and 
raising the standards of living.The phrasing of these 
two alternatives indicated which the authors preferred. The 
authors provided great detail on the effects the two alterna- 
tives presented to both Canada and the United States as well 
to the world as a whole. 
Under the first alternative of autarky and bilateral- 
ism, various mechanisms such as rigid control of foreign 
exchanges, clearing agreements, import quotas, subsidization 
of exports, and centralized government purchasing would be 
required.These mechanisms were anathema to the Americans 
and evoked mixed feelings from the Canadians. Certainly 
control of foreign exchange, import quotas, and subsidiza- 
tion of exports were mechanisms Canada had used in the inter- 
3°PAC, RG19, vol. 3977, file E-3-2, Joint Economic 
Committees, "Report on International Economic Collaboration", 
5 December 19^1, p. 3* 
^^lUid. 
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war period. Canada would not relinquish them in the postwar 
era without asstirances that they would be unnecessary. How- 
ever, the Canadian officials were in complete agreement with 
the Americans in opposing the resort to autarky when the 
report went on to suggest that large industrial nations 
would 
. . . use the bargaining power of their large markets 
to play one small country off against the other in order 
to obtain their requirements of raw materials and 
agricultural products at the lowest possible prices. 
At the same time, each large industrial country could 
block the proceeds of its purchases and could thus in 
large measure, force the raw material and agricultural 
exporters to buy their imported manufactured goods ex- 
clusively from it at dictated prices.32 
While the report presented such a, pessimistic view of what 
Britain might resort to, it stressed that "the resort to 
autarky may not be a matter of choice but of necessity . .” 
Under this system of autarky and bilateralism, the report 
concluded that the United States would be better off than 
most countries but it would "completely wreck an exposed 
economy such as Canada. This conclusion was essentially 
correct. Studies by Hansen’s economic subcommittee of the 
Council on Foreign Relations suggested that the United States 
could satisfy most of its export-import requirements even if 
pp.. 4-5 
p. 7. 
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it were denied a European market.That was not true for 
Canada. According to the report by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Canadian exports to the United States had already 
achieved their maxiratim level. Canada was obliged to find 
other outlets for her exports if she wished to maintain a 
high level of international activity and ultimately a high 
level of employment. The conclusions reached in this report 
underscored Canada's stake in multilateral trade while mini- 
mizing the urgency of such a programme for the United States. 
This is not to say that the United States, or at least some 
influential circles in the United States, were not interested 
in multilateral trade. Howeve’r, the need for it was certainly 
less striking in the American case than it was for Canada. 
To fulfill the second alternative of expanding multi- 
lateral trade, the Report noted that . , there must be 
collaboration in the whole range of direct international 
activities — the stabilization of exchange rates; the 
control of capital movements; the direction of external 
investment and development policies; the adjustment of tariff 
and commercial restrictions; the use of shipping and other 
^^The Library, Arthur Upgren, "Economic Trading Blocs 
and Their Importance to the United States", 10 February 19^1, 
Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, 
Economic and Financial Series, No, E-B2?, and William Diebold 
jr., "Methods of Economic Collaborations Methods of 
Measuring Self-Sufficiency", 25 June 1941, Ibid., No. E-B34, 
Supplement I. 
international services.Even though the Report stated 
that "it is not suggested that a giant international "blue- 
print formulating detailed policy on all these matters is 
desirable. . . ,**,^*^ it is interesting to note that virtually 
all of these international activities were later included in 
the- White Plan. The Resolution did not address the immediate 
postwar problems of relief and reconstruction per se, however, 
it^ recommended that this could be better met by different 
organizations.^^ The stabilization of exchange rates in the 
Committee's Resolution is particularly noteworthy as it was 
given a. position of primacy in both this Report and in 
White's Stabilization Fund Plan. 
Another Canadian official involved in economic plan- 
ning was R.B. Bryce, the Secretary to the Economic Advisory 
Gommitteev^^ In a confidential memorandum dated December 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 39779 file E-3-2, Joint Economic 
Committees, "Report on International Economic Collaboration", 
5 December 19^1, p. 12. 
^®PAC, RGI9, vol. 3977, file E-3-2, W.A, Mackintosh 
to W.L., Mackenzie King, 1? December 19^1. 
^^The EAC was established by Order in Council, P.C. 
2698 on 1^ September 1939r to coordinate economic and finan- 
cial policy. Bryce was not originally appointed by Order 
in Council, as were the other members except Mackintosh, but 
". . . simply by action of the Committee itself." PAC, RGI9, 
vol., 4660^ file 187, R.B. B:^ce to Miss E. Satmders (Secre- 
tary, Civil Service Commission), 4 August 19^0. 
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19^1 Bryce discussed the "Basic Issues in Post-War Inter- 
. 40 
national Economic Relations" from a Canadian perspective. 
The central theme of this paper revealed Bryce's economic 
views. Bryce believed that two great economic needs of the 
postwar period were inherited from the interwar period. These 
were ”. .. . first the need to achieve a much higher, as well 
as a more stable, level of employment; and second, the need 
to make more effective use of our labour and other resources 
by taking advantage of the possibilities of international ex- 
41 
change of goods, services and capital." The prevailing 
popular attitude in Canada,, according to Bryce, gave support 
to his emphasis on the need for high employment levels, albeit 
for slightly different reasons. Although the connection to 
international trade may have been too abstract for the average 
Canadian to appreciate, ". . the war has convinced the man 
in the street, indeed even the man in business that govern- 
ments can put men to work and make private business profitable 
by spending money, and, what is more, that when need arises, 
42 
the money can be found in undreamt of quantities." As a 
former student of Keynes, Bryce knew all too well that the 
^°PAC, RG19, vol. 3977. file E-3-2, R.B. Bryce, 
"Basic Issues in Post-War International Economic Relations", 
n.d. December 1941. 
^4l3id., p, 1. 
p. 2. 
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maintenance of high levels of employment went hand in hand 
with buoyant international trade. Because the Canadian 
economy was so dependent on international trade, the sound- 
ness of this aspect of Keynes* teaching was easy to see. 
While many countries could find themselves in a 
similar predicament to Canada, Bryce noted that Britain and 
the United States were not among them. Certainly Canada was 
not a unique nation in that she needed to trade with a 
sterling country and an American dollar country to maintain 
an equilibrium in her balance of payments. Many South 
American, coxintries found themselves in this situation. Like 
his colleagues, Bryce assumed that Britain would find her 
balance of international payments in complete disarray after 
the war. Similarly, Bryce concluded it ". may be that no 
other course will be open to Britain except to restrict in 
some way or other the use of [American] dollars to the more 
essential purposes, - which may involve what will appear to 
be discrimination in trade or exchange policies.” / Bryce 
understated *what will appear to be discrimination* for it 
surely would be discrimination even though it was necessary 
in the British circumstances. Nevertheless he demonstrated 
the same \inderstending as Mackintosh and Deutsch had that, 
irrespective of the existence of an enlightened economic 
^^ibid., p. 6. 
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policy in Britain, British officials might not have any 
alternative but to pursue an autarkic policy. Consequently, 
many nations would be faced with the choice of trading with 
one currency or the other.. Either choice could have devastat- 
ing effects on their economies. 
Even though there might have been less urgency for 
the United States to press for growth in international trade 
as a means to achieving high levels of employment, Bryce noted 
that, spokesmen in the United States, both official 
and unofficial, are making it quite clear that they hope 
and expect to see equal treatment in trade policies estab- 
ILIL 
lished as a general rule after the war." Bryce recognized 
that freer trade policies could be beneficial to the United 
States as: that country was confident that its industries 
could compete with any nation in an open market. However, 
Bryce believed that a more important reason lay behind this 
American internationalism. This reason had been developed 
by the State Department and was not strictly economic in 
natiire. Bryce maintained that the underlying purpose of the 
United States policy was based on recognition of the 
danger of international friction, ill-will and instability 
which is.created by international bargaining and discrimina- 
tion." ^ Like Mackintosh and Deutsch, Bryce recognized the 
United States to have a legitimate desire to promote inter- 
ILIL 
^^Ibid, 
^^Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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national trade. 
Bryce assumed that American open trade policy would 
prevail over other nations* trade policies because the 
United States was " . . . the great economic power, . . . the 
greatest creditor nation in the world, with nearly all its 
[the world's] gold reserves and the major source of its 
[the world's] currency savings.Bryce envisaged several 
mechanisms at work which would operate this system of multi- 
lateralism. But, unlike his colleagues, Bryce placed less 
emphasis on exchange stability, although he recognized that 
exchange stability was likely to be an even greater problem 
after the war than before it. He knew that there would be 
even less willingness to maintain stable exchanges at the 
expense of the domestic economy after the war than before 
it. Bryce* believed that,* if international trade were devel- 
oped on a large scale and based on a high level of employment, 
there would be less danger of exchange instability. ^ In 
this emphasis on expansion in international trade instead 
of exchange stability, Bryce was espousing Keynesian prin- 
ciples . 
A memorandum circulating among a select group of 
Canada's mandarins identifies two principal schools of 
p. 9. 
p. 8. 
As with the memorandum by 
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economic policy in Britain. 
Bryce, this memorandum also suggested, that Britain would be 
faced after the war with a shortage of foreign exchange and 
loss of overseas markets and thus would experience great 
difficulty in purchasing imports.. The author of the memo- 
randum also noted, probably with Canadian trade in mind, 
that the countries from which Britain would wish to purchase 
raw materials would have greatly developed their manufactur- 
ing industries during the war. In all likelihood these 
coimtries would seek to protect their industries by various 
forms of restrictive measures. To open these countries to 
British trade, the memorandiim -under discussion reported that, 
as the leaders of one school of thought> Keynes and the 
Economic Adviser to the United Kingdom Treasury, Hubert D. 
Henderson, advocated that Britain make a series of bilateral 
trade agreements with the major resources-producing coimtries, 
binding them to purchase British manufactured goods. Even 
though the other school of thought, led by Lionel Robbins 
and J.E, Meade, both Economic Assistants for the Economic 
Section of the Cabinet Office, advocated freer trade, the 
memorandum suggested that the Keynes and Henderson school 
was more influential in shaping British economic policy. 
Not everyone, however, shared this concern about 
ho 
Bank of Canada Archives (hereafter BCA), LR?6- 
191-7, C.H. Herbert, "International Trade After the War", 
14 January 1942. 
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the hilateralist nature of the Keynes school, as was indi- 
cated by the response from the Assistant Chairman of the 
Foreign Exchange Control Board, Louis Rasminsky; '* , the 
opposition between the views of Robbins and Meade and those 
of Keynes and Henderson may be less difficult to resolve 
than appears on surface.The reason Rasminsky believed 
these two opposing views were not; difficult to resolve was 
revealed about a month later. After a meeting with Sir 
Arthur Salter, United Kingdom Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Minister of War Trasport, Redvers Opie, Counsellor at 
the British Embassy in the United States, and R.H. Tawney, 
Advisor on Social and Economic subjects at the British 
Embassy in the United States, Rasminsky noted? ”I gather 
that the Henderson bilateralist views are losing groiand in 
the U.K.. and that even Keynes now is shifting his ground 
because he feels that attempts at U.K. bilateralism will 
lead to serious.[political friction with the U.S.”-^^ It 
seemed from Rasminsky*s perspective, that the bilateralist 
school had gradually moved into an international framework 
because of American opposition rather than shift in ideology. 
The 14 January 1942 memorandum also noted the views 
^%CA, LR76-I9I, Louis Rasminsky to C.H. Herbert, 
20 December 1941. 
^°PAC, RGI9. vol. 3977, file E-3-K3), Louis 
Rasminsky, ’’Meeting of Council on Foreign Relations, New 
York, January 24, 1942”, n.d. 
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of Americans on international economic policy. It reported 
that the Department of State followed Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull's policy of lower tariffs through mutual agree- 
ments and a strict avoidance of discriminatory tariffs, 
clearing agreements, exchange restrictions or any other 
mechanism that was linked to bilateralism. Hull advocated 
lower tariffs because ” unhampered trade dovetailed 
( 
with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic 
competition, with war.'*-^^ However, it was noted that a few 
individuals within the State Department favoured bilateral 
trade arrangements over multilateral trade policies. The 
memorandum identified the policies of the United States 
Treasury as lying closer to the official State Department 
view but recognized that abolishing all forms of restrictive 
trade agreements might be impossible for countries in a weak 
economic position. As a result, the Treasury Department was 
prepared to allow a measure of bilateralism on condition 
that multilateralism was the ultimate objective. Like other 
Canadian officials who examined the British position and the 
American response, this memorandum indicated that the pre- 
dominant American view was towards freer multilateral trade. 
To prevent bilateralism it was thought the United States had 
two options: first, to provide financial assistance to 
Great Britain and others during the transition period, or 
^^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1, 
(New York: Macmillan, 1948), p, 18. 
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second, to engage in economic warfare with Britain and the 
Empire. Obviously, if the United States were committed to 
multilateralism, the only policy open to it was to pursue 
the first option- Certainly this option, which preserved 
the multilateral trade pattern, was preferable to Canada 
and Canadian officials consequently endeavoured to bind the 
United States to multilateralism. The effort to ensure that 
the United States would be involved in the promotion of 
multilateral trade might seem to be an easy task, as it 
appeared the United States was already favourably inclined 
towards it. However, it should be kept in mind that, while 
there was an indication that the United States would promote 
such a policy, this was by no means certain. 
H.L. Keenleyside, the Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, also commented on Anglo-American 
relations with specific reference to the divergent economic 
policies emanating from the United States arid the United 
Kingdom. Keenleyside sent the Prime Minister a memorandum 
concerning a conversation he had with '* friends occu- 
pying positions of importance in, or in relation to, the 
<2 
White House, the State Department, and the Treasury. 
Keenleyside noted that a clash of economic opinions between 
two opposing groups was growing in intensity in the United 
Keenleyside to W.L.M. King, 15 September 
19^1, in Documents. vol. 7» pt. 1, Doc. o4l, p. 501* 
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States. The Assistsuit Under-Secretary of State referred to 
these two groups as the *Freer Traders' and the *Autarchists*. 
The Freer Traders "believed that the international and domes- 
tic economic problems, both at the present and in the future, 
could be solved by a policy of freer trade. This group 
recognized: 
. . . that at the conclusion of the war it will be 
necessary for the United States to continue to contribute 
to the support of Britain and the deniDcratic powers, and 
to assist in the rehabilitation of central Europe. They 
believe that this can best be done by assisting those 
crippled powers to gain easy access to sources of raw 
material and achieve relative prosperity by a tremendous 
expansion of international trade. They recognize that 
this will involve a momentous reduction in the United 
States tariff rates and for this they are prepared to 
fight the dissidents within their own ranks and within 
the United States generally.53 
The Autarchists argued that, because trade and exchange 
controls would likely continue into the postwar period, it 
would not be . . worth while to bother trying to re- 
establish any very large volume of general trade with Europe 
or Asia. The Autarchists maintained that, ^. . . in any 
case, North and South America can become almost self-suffi- 
cient. If North and South America did become self-suffi- 
cient, Canada would suffer a severe dislocation in her 
traditional trade relationship. Cut off from her United 
^^Ibid. 
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Kingdom market, Canada would be completely under the sway of 
the American economy. 
Although the Freer Traders had the support of the 
Administration, Keenleyside suggested that the "President 
and his advisors are under severe and growing pressure from 
those who want the United States to adopt ’self-sufficiency* 
as the national watchword.When Keynes, Arthur Salter, 
the Head of British Merchant Shipping Mission in Washington 
and former Director of the Economic and Financial Section of 
the League of Nations, Sir Frederick Phillips, the Joint 
Second Secretary for the United Kingdom Treasury, and other 
United Kingdom economists expressed opinions which undermined 
the position of the Freer Traders, a tremendous strain was 
put on Anglo-American relations. These British economists 
claimed that the " . . proper course for Britain to follow 
will be to maintain all her war-time controls, imite the 
sterling bloc as closely as possible, and engage in trade 
with other areas only to the extent that bilateral arrange- 
ments can be made on advantageous terms. Keenleyside 
related the consequences this would have for Canada when he 
remarked " . this will mean that Great Britain will buy 
from Canada only goods equivalent to the amount of Canadian 
p. 503. 
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purchases from the United Kingdom.Keenleyside was 
immensely concerned about the effect these British economists 
could have in strengthening opposition to the Freer Traders. 
The Assistant Under-Secretary of State wrote: 
It is not by any means impossible that a reactionary 
movement may, within the next two years, become a real 
menace to all the Roosevelt policies. . . . Yet the 
activities of Mr. Keynes and the others mentioned above 
are calculated to contribute directly and materially to 
just such a result.59 
Keenleyside proposed immediate intervention into this state 
of affairs because "economic warfare between the United 
Kingdom and the United States would be a tragedy for them- 
selves, for the world, and perhaps above all, for Canada. 
In spite of the obstacles in the path of the free 
trade policies of the American Administration, there were 
positive signs emanating from the United States as early as 
December 19^1 which indicated that she would vigorously press 
for international trade policies. In another memorandum to 
King written late in 19^1, the Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs noted that, in return for Lease-Lend 
assistance, "what the United States wants is an undertaking 
now that the United Kingdom will cooperate with the United 
States in pursuing a liberal international economic policy 
5®Ibid. 
^^Ibid., p. 505. 
®°Ibid. 
59 
after the war. The United States regards the aholition of 
import discriminations as an essential objective for workable 
6l 
post-war economic arrangements.” In essence the United 
States wanted to see the end to Imperial preferences. The 
Under-Secretary of State also noted that, "the United Kingdom 
is reluctant to accept this objective in terms at this time 
because it feels that it^ implies the ultimate abandonment of 
the right of Empire countries to grant each other exclusive 
6 2 
trade preferences.” As for Canada's position on this, he 
noted that 
.„ . we have a greater interest in supporting the main 
objectives of American international economic policy. 
As Acheson pointed out to Lord Halifax, the United States 
proposals recognize the primary importance of increased 
economic activity, both national and international, in 
employment, production, consumption and exchange of 
goods. It is against this background and in conjunction 
with it that there are added/the objectives of the elim- 
ination of the discriminatory treatment^, reduction of 
tariffs and the achievement of other economic objectives 
of the Atlantic Charter. They recognize explicitly that 
a liberalization of commercial policy is a question that 
requires action by all participants and that high stan- 
dards of productivity and consximption will be required to 
succeed on it.°3 
Canadian policymakers considered two alternatives to 
be open to them. The first was to side with the *Autarchists*. 
6l 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the 
Prime Minister, 30 December 19^1# in Documents. vol, 9, 
Doc. 559» PP* 6O4-5. 
^%bid., p. 605. 
^^Ibid., p. 606. 
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Canadian officials rightly sought to avoid this as it would 
cause the Canadian economy to fall completely into the 
American nexus. If Canada followed the *Autarchist* programme 
trade outside the North and South American continents would 
he reduced to a minimal level. Because Canada conducted 
very little trade with South American countries virtually 
all Canadian imports and exports would he.dependent upon 
the United States. The second was to support the ’Freer 
Traders*. The *Freer Traders* were appealing because 
Canadian export trade could continue along more or less 
traditional routes, or so it seemed. In reality, the British 
maxket was not as secure for Canadian exporters as many 
believed. In spite of the warnings of many renowned British 
economists, no one in Canada, considered Britain to be inca- 
pable of expauiding economically in a free trade world. This 
was regrettable because Britain's prosperity was directly 
linked to Canada’s success in preserving her export market. 
If Britain did not prosper, then her capacity to import 
would diminish. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANS 
Shortly after World War Two broke out the Germans 
espoused the creation of a *new world order* that would end 
the tremendous disorder of the interwar period. Under the 
direction of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Reichsminister of Economics, 
the Germans circtimvented the need for large monetary reserves 
to finance trade through a programme that provided effective 
utilization of an economic bloc. Under the leadership of the 
Germans, trade was restricted to a small group of nations, 
in order to ensure both markets and supplies for countries 
within the economic bloc. The propaganda value of this 
’new order* on the overall war effort was immense. German 
domination would be more easily accepted if the economic 
disorders of previous decades were abolished. 
The British were quick to see the propaganda value 
of the *new order* and sought, to counter it. In late 19^0, 
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, enquired of the Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer if it might be possible to have 
6l 
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Keynes ” . . . prepare an authoritative statement exposing 
the fallacious character of the German promises for a ’New 
Order' .'*^ Keynes responded on 25 November 19^0, with a 
memorandiim entitled "Proposals to Counter the German ’New 
Order’"' and it was circulated within the United Kingdom 
2 
Treasury on 1 December 19^0. However» rather than criti- 
cizing the ’new order’, Keynes found much to commend in its 
basic principles; 
This idea was to cut the knot by discarding the use of 
a currency having international validity and substitute 
for it what amounted to barter, not indeed between 
individuals, but between different economic units. In 
this way he [Dr. Schacht] was able to return to the 
essential character and original piirpose of trade whilst 
discarding the apparatus which had been supposed to 
facilitate, but was in fact^ strangling it. This innova- 
tion worked well, indeed brilliantly . . .3 
Even though the Germans were using this ’new order’ to build 
up their war machine, Keynes recognized the effectiveness of 
the German programme. Together with a colleague in the 
United Kingdom Treasury, H.D.. Henderson, Keynes believed 
that the programme would have worked equally well had Germany 
^Quoted from Donald E. Moggridge (ed.). The Collected 
Writings. vol. 25t Activities 1940-1944; Shaping the Post- 
War World; The Clearing Union, (New Yorks Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), (hereafter Collected Writings, vol. 25), p. 7* 
2 
J.M. Keynes, "Proposals to Coimter the German ’New 
Order”’, in Collected Writings, vol.. 251 p. 7* 
%.M. Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy", 8 September 
19^1, in Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 23. 
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. washed for butter instead of guns or aeroplanes.'* 
Unlike Dr. Schacht, however, Keynes believed that it was 
possible to use a currency having international validity 
without reverting to the '* . currency disorders of the 
epoch between the wars . . There needed to be '* . a 
refinement and improvement of the Schachtian device.'*^ Keynes* 
determination to provide Britain with her own "new order" 
resulted in his proposal for an International Currency Union. 
This soon became known as the Clearing Union. Although a 
draft of this proposal was first circulated in the Treasury 
on 8 September 19^1, it was mid-December before his proposal 
took the shape it retained throughout the wartime discussions. 
In a scathing criticism of the old gold standard 
\ 
system Keynes wrote that "the problem of maintaining equilib- 
rium in the balance of payments between coimtries has never 
been solved since methods of barter gave way to the use of 
money and bills of exchange."*^ Instead of using gold as an 
international monetary imit, Keynes offered " . a quan- 
U 
J.M. Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy", Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» P« 23., and PAC, RG19f vol. 3977» file 
E-3-1, H.D. Henderson, "The Nineteen Thirties", 11 August 
19^1. 
•^Ibid., p. 24. 
'J.M. Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy", 8 September 
1941, in Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 21. 
6^ 
tiim of international currency which is neither determined in 
an -unpredictable and irrelevant manner as, for example, by 
the technical progress of the gold industry nor subject to 
large variations depending on the gold reserves policies of 
g 
individual countries . This new unit, which Keynes 
christened "bancor”, was to be ” . fixed by reference to 
the sum of each co\mtry*s exports and imports on the average 
of (say) the three pre-war years Bancor could be 
transferred to a country's account in exchange for gold and 
bancor was to be given a value in terms of gold although 
this value could be altered. The archaic notion that a gold 
parity had to be maintained at all costs was rejected. Keynes 
implied, however, that "the position of gold would be left 
substantially unchanged.Nevertheless, bancor could not 
be translated into gold on demand, except under special 
circumstances. Keynes had long considered gold a 'barbarous 
relic', but he recognized that "gold also has the merit of 
providing, in point of form whatever the underlying realities 
may be, an uncontroversial standard of value for international 
purposes, for which it may not yet be easy to find a service- 
g 
J.M. Keynes, "Proposals for an International Currency 
Union", 15 December 19^1, Preface, Para. C, in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» P- 8^. 
^Ibid., Para. 6(3)* 
p. 84. 
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able substitute.The role of gold in the Clearing Union 
was, however, of symbolic value only. This limited role 
came to light during a discussion on the Clearing Union at 
a meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction 
Problems; ”Mr. Keynes, in reply to a question as to how 
these proposals differed from the old theory of the gold 
standard, remarked that he did not think that he personally 
would be suspected of tenderness towards the gold standard. 
In fact these proposals completely dethroned gold in polite 
12 language. '* 
Each member nation of the Union would be allotted a 
quota which would permit it to, conduct trade in the postwar 
era at a level of activity commensurate to that of the pre-war 
period. The allotted quota was an important feature because 
of the tremendous dislocation of the world's gold reserves. 
This was obviously beneficial to nations with relatively 
small reserves but possessing a large volume of trade, such 
as Britain. It offered less direct benefits for coxmtries 
such as the United States which held large reserves and were 
less dependent on international trade. However, there were 
benefits. No nation would be isolated from the effects of 
world trade, as had occurred in the Great Depression. Keynes 
^^Ibid., p. 85- 
IP 
"From Minutes of Meeting of the War Cabinet Commit- 
tee on Reconstruction Problems", 31 March 19^2, Collected 
Writings, vol. 25, p. 1^0. 
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had not followed the short-sighted nationalist policy of 
devising a plan that would benefit only Britain. It has 
been said of Keynes that, had he died in 193^* 
he might possibly have been classified,, in the sphere 
of commercial policy, as an apologist for economic 
nationalism; ... Be this as it may, the Keynes of the 
war period was a consummate internationalist,, and the 
apparent shift in his point of view appears to have been 
very largely the result of the change in the international 
environment.13 
Although Keynes may not have been as consummate in his 
internationalism as was suggested, he desired to facilitate 
Britain’s trade with other countries as part of his primary 
objective of achieving full employment in the British economy. 
Full eraployroent in Keynesiaui economic thought was dependent 
upon expanding international trade. Keynes’ "economic 
nationalism" was inextricably interwoven with his inter- 
nationalism; the two went hand in hand. 
Another feature of the proposed Union that exem- 
plified its expansionist character was what Keynes frequently 
alluded to as the "essential banking principle". This 
principle was simply the "necessary equality of credits and 
debits" which was chauracteristic of the closed bainking system 
n/L 
Of the United Kingdom. Under this principle "... credit 
^^Randall Hinshaw, "Keynesian Commercial Policy", in 
Seymour E. Harris (ed.), The New Economics, p. 321. 
lA 
Kenneth Dam, Rules of the Game: Reform and 
Evolution in the International Monetary System. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, I982), p. ?2. 
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was automatically extended by those countries which at any 
moment had a favourable balance of payments to those countries 
which at any moment had an unfavourable balance.That is, 
no credits or debits on current accoimt transactions could 
be removed from the Clearing Union and a perfect balance 
would always be maintained. Since nations could trade freely 
within prescribed limits, a debit on one side of the account- 
ing ledger would always be matched by a credit on the other 
side. Because bancor was to be universally accepted, defi- 
ciencies in foreign exchange holdings or in reserves would 
not hamper trade. This automatic extension of credit had an 
appeal to nations that had experienced difficulties in the 
past in financing their international trade. Keynes felt 
that this aspect of his proposal had special merit because; 
Our British problem of gaining enough receipts overseas 
to balance our import requirements is so acute that we 
car scarcely hope to solve it except through a scheme 
which . . . provides us with a margin during the period 
before we can re-establish equilibritim by an intema- 
tional scheme which does not require us to ask particular 
favours or accommodations from the U.S. but merely 
gives to us, and requires of us, the same facilities for 
the expansion of international trade and the maintenance 
of international equilibrium which all the countries 
will be asked to receive and to allow . . .^° 
The appeal to creditor nations was less obvious. The source 
^%AC, RG19, vol. 3989,. file T-2-9-2, "Report of the 
Canadian Representatives at the 'Post-War Economic Talks’ 
Held in London Between October 23rd and November 9*th, 1942”, 
part II, "International Clearing Union", n.d.; Earlier drafts 
of part II "International Clearing Union" found in Rasminsky’s 
file at BCA, LR?6-188. 
Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union" 15 December 1941, Section 12, in Collected 
Writings. vol. 25, p. 94. 
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of the credit was '’anonymous" and removed the special status 
accorded creditor nations in the past which had allowed 
them, for good or ill, to dictate certain policies as 
criteria for the extension of credit. 
This ’essential hanking principle’ met with criti- 
cism from nations not familiar with its practice. In a 
recent analysis of the Clearing Union Kenneth Dam, an 
economist,, maintains that the "hanking principle" could have 
heen "... restructured as simple lending as part of a line 
of credit, if Keynes had heen more interested in American 
understanding than in abstract elegance.Dam underesti- 
mates Keynes’ knowledge of the United States, however, and 
hinda Keynes in a dogmatic strait-jacket. In a study on 
"The Pragmatic Basis of Keynes’s Political. Economy", Dudley 
Dillard asserts that, "ir the influence of Lord Keynes were 
limited to the field of technical economic doctrine it would 
he of little interest to the world at large. However, 
political economic policy hears even more deeply than eco- 
l8 
nomic theory the imprint of Keynesian thought." In a 
letter to his colleague Richard Kahn, just prior to a complet- 
ing his first draft of the Clearing Union plan, Keynes 
stated that he was not concerned with abstract elegance; 
^"^Dam, p. 78. 
18 
Dudley Dillard, "The Pragmatic Basis of Keynes’s 
Political Economy", Journal of Economic History 6 (November 
1946);121. 
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my aim will be not to allow [Robert Jones] Shackle and 
others to waste too much of my time, but to aim at 
putting the practical problem in its true light and 
then concentrate on technical means of solution without 
bothering myself about ideals, which, whether right or 
wrong, are in actual circumstance pure fantasy.^9 
Keynes realized that, if his Union were to work 
effectively, it must have some kind of self-correcting 
feature similar to that found in the pre-19l4 gold standard. 
Thus a member country would be permitted to draw up to one- 
quarter of its quota from the Union without restriction. 
Once the one-quarter mark had been exceeded, a charge of one 
percent would be put on its balance; a further one percent 
20 
charge would be added when one-half of its quota was drawn. 
These charges were inducements to the coimtry to bring its 
balance of payments back into equilibrium. In order to 
facilitate this balance, a country could devalue its currency 
by five percent annually once it had exceeded one-quarter of 
of its quota. This was no doubt a reflection of the problems 
encountered by Britain in the 1920*s and early 1930*s when 
its currency was fixed at an unalterable rate and also of 
the relatively successful experience .of the mid-1930*s when 
the pound was permitted to fluctuate. Although Keynes was no 
Keynes to Richard Kahn, 21 August 1941, in 
Collected Writings, vol. 25» P- 20. 
20 J.M. Keynes, ’’Proposals for an International 
Currency Union”, 15 December 1941, in Collected Writings, 
vol. 25, p. 20. 
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21 
advocate of fluctuating exchanges, he maintained that the 
correct value of any currency might he difficult to determine 
and accepted that some measure of flexibility was therefore 
desirable. The purpose of the charge on debit balances had 
its parallel in the pre-19l4 era when losses from a country's 
gold reserves indicated a disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments and, if persistent, provided the incentive to cor- 
rect it. To prevent delinquent nations from drawing on the 
Union without restraint, a country that exceeded one-half 
of its quota would be obliged to seek permission and coiinsel- 
ling from the Union before it could undertake future trans- 
. 22 
actions. 
One of the most striking features of the proposal 
was the responsibility Keynes placed on creditor nations. 
Under the gold standard the mechanism for equilibrating the 
balance of international payments required that debtor and 
creditor nations meet halfway in the adjustments that would 
restore equilibrium. However, Keynes recognized that: 
. . . if a country is in economic importance even one- 
fifth of the world as a whole, a given loss of gold will 
presumably exercise four times as much pressure at home 
as abroad , . . so that the contribution in terms of the 
resulting social strains which the debtor country had 
to make to the restoration of equilibrium by changing 
its prices and wages is altogether out of proportion 
21 
See J.M. Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy", 
8 September 19^1, in Collected Writings, vol. 25f p. 23* 
22 J.M. Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union”, paras. 6(5)b and 6(6), in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25. 
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to the contribution asked of its creditors. Nor is 
this all. To begin with, the social strain of an 
adjustment downwards is much greater than that of an 
adjustment upwards. And besides this, the process of 
adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary 
for the creditor.23 
The experience of the 1930*s demonstrated that creditor 
nations were not always willing to volunteer their share in 
the process of adjustment. With the United States likely 
to be the only major creditor nation in the postwar period, 
Keynes felt the urgency to ensure a creditor nation would 
assume its share of responsibility in the adjustment process. 
In a rather blunt fashion Keynes explained that '* . the 
aim would be to interfere as little as possible, provided 
that a balance is maintained with the outside world as a 
whole. But imquestionably it would involve a discrimination 
against the United States if she persisted in maintaining an 
oh 
unbalanced creditor position.” As a result, the one and 
two percent charges which were to be applied when debit 
balances exceeded one-quarter and one-half of the country's 
quota were also to be applied to credit balances which ex- 
ceeded specified quota levels.. One Canadian commentator on 
this aspect of the Clearing Union observed at the time: "It 
is naturally difficult to say to what extent this stress on 
the responsibility of the creditor countries reflects a 
Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy”, 8 Septem- 
ber 194'!, in Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 28. 
Keynes to F.T. Ashton-Gwatkin, 25 April 19^1, 
in Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 1?. 
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strikingly rapid progress of economic thought in official 
circles in the United Kingdom during the past few years 
and to what extent it reflects the loss of foreign assets.'*^^ 
It is safe to assume rapid progression in economic thought, 
as Keynes* reason for implementing this principle but one 
can only speculate whether the United Kingdom Treasury would 
have adopted this plan had there been a possibility that the 
United Kingdom would be the creditor nation. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Clearing 
Union proposal was the provision to attach postwar relief 
26 
and rehabilitation schemes to the Union. Keynes suggested 
that provision for extending credits was necessary to meet 
peculiar financial needs in the transitional period and had 
advantages for coimtries who sought such credit. Like the 
regular functioning of the "banking principle", the source 
of these credits would be anonymous. This meant that debtor 
countries would not have to go *hat in hand* to a creditor 
nation to obtain the funds needed to prevent deflationary 
pressures, particularly diiring the transitional phase of 
^%AC, RGI9, vol. 3989, file T-2-9-2, "Report of the 
Canadian Representatives at the * Post-War Economic Talks* 
Held in London Between October 23rd and November 19^2”, 
part II, "International Clearing Union”, n.d,, by Rasminsky. 
See section VIII of J.M.- Keynes, "Proposals for an 
International Currency Union”, 15 December 19^1# in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25. 
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relief and reconstruction. Conversely, a creditor nation 
would not be obliged to use its government's legislative 
processes, which could be narrowly self-interested, in order 
to extend credit to countries in need of it. The inclusion 
of this provision was likely related to passage of two pieces 
of American legislation, the Johnson Debt-Default Act of 
193^ and the Neutrality Act of 1939» which effectively 
blocked the United States Government and its citizens from 
extending credit to Britain.Although it could be argued 
that the Lease-Lend Agreement of 19^1 enabled the United 
States to extend aid to Britain’s war-torn economy, it did 
so at a high cost to Britain, W.C. Clark participated in 
some of the informal discussions between the United States 
and United Kingdom Treasuries on this issue and reported 
that, ” . . , during the last two weeks [prior to 21 March 
19^1] there had been two series of crises between Mr. Morgen- 
thau and the U.S. Treasury on the one hand, and Sir Frederick 
Phillips or Sir Edward Peacock and the British Treasury on 
pO 
the other hand." The cause of these crises was the deter- 
mination of the United States to " strip the British of 
27 
^Warren F. Kimball, "Beggar My Neighbour; America 
and the British Interim Finance Crisis, 1940-19^1,” Journal 
of Economic History 29 (December 1969);?58. 
pO 
W.C. Clark, "Report on Visit to Washington, March 
17-21", 21 March 19^1» in Documents, vol. 8, pt. 1, Doc. I85, 
P. 299. 
7^ 
all their assets in the United States.The first crisis 
arose from Morgenthau*s insistence on ” sending a 
British cruiser from Brazil to South Africa to pick up $120 
million of gold and take it to the United States in order 
that he might be able to announce that all the gold production 
of South Africa during the last three months had been turned 
over to him by the British.The second crisis was due to 
the forced liquidation of British direct investments in the 
United States. The British sought to delay this liquidation 
by raising numerous objections over the sale of their invest- 
ments which proved "intensely irritating to Mr. Morgenthau 
Consequently Morgenthau; 
instructed [ Lord] Halifax that progress must be shown 
immediately by the sale of at least one substantial 
direct investment. The result was that, in spite of all 
the difficulties which had been conjured up previously, 
the British were able to sell the American Viscose 
Company (subsidiary of Courtaulds) at the end of last 
week and had to agree that the price received was pretty 
satisfactory. The British, however, resent having to 
continue to sell their direct investments and their de- 
lays and objections will be a continuing source of irri- 
tation to the U.S. Treasury.32 
The provision for attaching the relief and rehabilitation 
29 Ibid. 
^^Ibid., p. 296; Clark went on; "to make this even 
physically possible involved the most extraordinary series of 
transactions which I cannot put down on paper. Certainly the 
public statement that will be made will be far from a candid 
presentation of the actual facts." 
31 
32 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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schemes to the Union was thus far more important than was 
suggested by Keynes* tentative phrasing: "the Union might 
set up a clearing account in favour of international bodies 
charged with post-war relief, rehabilitation and reconstruc- 
tion.”^^ Throughout the later discussions with the Americans, 
Keynes was xmwilling to abandon his essential banking prin- 
ciple, even when he conceded that his Union would operate 
very much like the American subscribed-capital fund. The 
reason for this refusal to abandon the banking principle was 
that ” . , the linking up with other international institu- 
tions [i.e. relief and rehabilitation schemes] would be 
difficult, if not impossible, on the subscribed capital 
basis But the Clearing Union came under heavy criticism 
both within Britain and abroad on the basis that linking up 
too many functions not relevant to the immediate objective 
of the plan could jeopardize the whole scheme. 
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the Clearing 
Union was that it was designed so that it would not ” 
interfere with the discretion of Central Banks which desire 
to maintain a special intimacy within a particular group of 
Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union", para. 38(1), in Collected Writings, vol. 25. 
Keynes to Sir Frederick Phillips, I6 April 
19^3» 5.n Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 249. 
^•^CA, LR76-188-18, Rasminsky, "Report on Visit to 
London October-November, 1942”, 28 November 1942. 
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countries associated by geographical or political ties, 
such as the sterling area . . . The war had increased 
the import requirements of the United Kingdom and the growth 
in imports disrupted the United Kingdom’s trade balance. 
Moreover, this trade imbalance was likely to continue into 
the postwar period. Consequently, United Kingdom officials 
wished to find a means of bringing their nation’s trade back 
into balance. The effective use of sterling and the influ- 
ence of the London banking establishment provided one means 
of achieving an increase in the volume of trade within the 
sterling area. As Ke3rnes explained in a letter to Harold 
Nicolson of the Foreign Office;, 
. . . the area pound is a simple mechanism to make the 
resources of the area available to traders all over the 
world. When you use it, you use the long-established 
and smooth, reliable machinery of the City of London, 
which has grown up on conducting international trade on 
the simplest, most honourable and cheapest basis. It 
avoids the complications of barter and compensation, 
which hide the lack of resources and - too often - the 
juggling of prices to the orgauiiser’s benefit which lie 
behind them. . . . [However] it is not sterling itself 
which is useful; it is the sterling area, to which it is 
the key, and that is necessary to all the world.37 
But the importance of sterling and the sterling area 
was not always clear during informal presentation of the 
Clearing Union plan. Rasminsky drove to the heart of the 
Keynes, ’’Proposals for an International 
Currency Union", para. 21, in Collected Writings, vol. 25. 
'Y? 
^^Keynes to Harold Nicolson, 20 November 1941, in 
Collected Writings, vol. 25, P* 7. 
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issue when he questioned the ability of a country to hold 
foreign reserves that were not reflected in its accoimt with 
the Union. Rasrainsky argued that the bancor position of a 
country should indicate ” the trend in the country's 
balance of payments, but in point of fact it may choose to 
pot up or dissipate outside gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
which means that the bancor position itself does not reflect 
its true international position. Rasminsky's argument 
was designed to determine the importance of the sterling 
area in relation to the Clearing Union proposal. The response 
he received was that it was ” better not to disturb 
existing practices any more than necessary.Stated more 
clearly, sterling would play a significant role in the 
ultimate effect of the Clearing Union plan. 
By holding sterling balances separate from the 
scrutiny and consequently the control of the Clearing Union, 
Britain would depend on sterling area relations to solve its 
postwar trade imbalance. As reported by a later observer, 
multilateral payments within an economic bloc, 
. . . could be possible but . . . would exclude countries 
such as the United States and Canada whose currencies, 
it is feared, are likely to become scarce. Trade between 
members of the currency bloc and non-members would be 
limited to the amount of non-member currencies available 
to each member of the bloc on the basis of a pooling 
^°PAC, RGI9, vol. 3989, file T-2-9-2, Louis Rasminsky 
to G.F. Towers, 4 November 1942. 
^%bid. 
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arrangement or as a result of each member's dealings 
with non-members. 
Consequently, Britain would seek to maintain a trade bloc 
that could be insulated from American and Canadian exports. 
Owing to this currency bloc,, the United States and Canada 
would be induced to increase their imports from this area so 
that more of their currencies would be at the disposal of thei 
member countries of the bloc. Once this foreign exchange 
(United States and Canadian currencies in this case) was at 
the disposal of the member countries, these countries would 
be able to purchase exports from the United States and Canada 
without depleting their reserves or foreign exchange holdings. 
This ability to discriminate against non-member countries 
was revealed in the exchange controls operated by Britain 
during the war period. As a result of these controls the 
Central Reserve into which 
. . . belligerent members of the Sterling Area paid gold 
and dollar earnings in exchange for British Government 
securities, and from which the British Government, in 
turn, made dollars available as needed by member 
nations . . . [provided] tight control [which] enabled 
the central banks of Sterling Area countries to dis- 
criminate against the scarce dollar. 
As the head of the sterling area, Britain was able to regu- 
late the movement of capital into and out of the area. Since 
ZLO 
Raymond Mikesell, "United States International 
Financial Policy", Canadian Journal of Economics and Pol- 
itical Science 12 (August 19^6):315* 
4l J.M. Livingstone, Britain and the World Economy. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 19^6),p. 37« 
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trade is "based on the movement of capital, Britain was able 
to control trade into and out of the sterling area. Although 
the objective in developing this economic bloc was to bal- 
ance trade between the sterling area and the non-sterling 
area, the fact remained that Britain controlled the sterling 
area. Since a balance was to be preserved between the 
sterling area and the non-sterling area, countries within 
the sterling bloc were encouraged to satisfy their trade 
requirements within the area. 
Keynes was committed to introducing a scheme that 
would provide as wide a multilateral trade relationship as 
the system could bear. However, Keynes was also cognizant 
of the dangers that would arise from a persistent reluctance 
by countries holding sterling to purchase British exports. 
The use of sterling encouraged trade within the sterling 
area but there was no guarantee that Britain's external 
trade would grow. Keynes* concern was evidenced in the fact 
that, even though the Clearing Union plan stated it would 
. restore imfettered multilateral clearing between its 
ILO 
members”, Keynes asserted that this clause ” . . was not 
intended to exclude bilateral trade agreements." ^ Indeed, 
42 
J.M. Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union", 15 December 1941, para. 17, in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25* 
^^BCA, LR76-I88-35* "Post War Economic Talks", Draft 
Minutes of Fourth Meeting, 28 October 1942. 
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in order to avoid the economic consequences, both inter- 
national and domestic, which would result should Britain be 
forced to reduce her exports, the Union left the door open 
for Britain to pursue measures that would ultimately en- 
courage British exports. Keynes realized that ” . of 
the special measures which it is open to us to employ by far 
the most potent is to use the importance of the British 
market to producers of food and raw materials overseas as 
an inducement to them to make equivalent purchases of manu- 
LLIL 
factured articles from us.” Because the Clearing Union did 
not preclude bilateral trade agreements and because of the 
provision for currency blocs, Keynes* proposal would aid 
the maintenance of an economic bloc with Britain at its 
centre. Britain’s attempt to dominate in this economic bloc, 
however, was in conflict with American desire for trade and 
financial influence within a sphere which encompassed the 
sterling, area. 
As soon as the war broke out, American officials gave 
thought to the problems that could arise in the postwar 
period. The development of official postwar economic plan- 
ning in the United States was divided between two depart- 
ments - the Department of State and the Department of the 
Treasury. Each of these departments struggled to become the 
ILIL _ 
J.M. Keynes, "Post-War Currency Policy", 8 September 
1941, in Collected Writings, vol. 25, pp. 25-26. 
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leading voice in guiding official American policy in this 
area. Since international trade and international finance 
are not activities that can he distinctly divided, both the 
State Department and the Treasury were justified in claiming 
that postwar economic planning fell within their jurisdiction. 
However, matters pertaining to international trade, which was 
the predominant domain of the State Department, were given 
early attention. The State Department demonstrated its early 
leadership in mid-September 1939 when the Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hull, appointed Leo Pasvolsky as Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State so that he could commence consid- 
eration of the economic problems that would likely arise 
after the war. It has been said of Pasvolsky, a Russian bom 
economist^, that ”... probably more than any one other 
single person [he] was the brains behind the postwar planning 
Ac 
of the United States government during these years.” Al- 
though Pasvolsky made the largest single contribution, the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a privately fimded 
organization which included Pasvolsky as one of its members, 
had a tremendous impact in shaping American policy. As an 
organization, the CFR provided a counter-weight to the 
isloationist sentiments that predominated in American poli- 
^Laurence A. Shoup, ’’Shaping the National Interest: 
The Council on Foreign Relations, the Department of State, 
and the Origins of the Post War World 1939-19^3/' (Ph.D, 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 19?4), p. 69, 
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cies after the Great War. As the United States gradually 
showed signs of shedding its isolationism, the CFR became 
an important body both in framing policy and as a recruit- 
ment ground for the State Department and the Treasury 
Department. At President Roosevelt's request in late 1939» 
Hull formed the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign 
47 
Policy. ' The Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, 
presided as chairman of the Committee which was further 
divided into three sub-committees, each designed to study a 
particular area of postwar planning. The Economic Sub-Com- 
mittee was chaired by Pasvolsky and included Adolf Berle 
and Herbert Feis. Both of these members, as well as Sumner 
Welles, were members of the CFR. 
Apart from sharing membership with influential 
government committees, the CFR had embarked on its own 
deliberations under the heading. Studies of American 
Interests in the War and the Peace, which produced an impres- 
sive quantity and quality of detailed memoranda. The 
programme of study was broken into various sections with the 
46 Laurence A. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial 
Brain Trust; The Council on Foreign Relations and United 
States Foreign PolicvT (New York:Monthly Review Press, 
1977), p. 18. 
^"^Ibid., p. 148; The formation of the Committee was 
publicly anno\mced on 8 January 19^0. See William L. 
Danger and S. Everett Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism; 
The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy. 
2 vols., (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 19^4), p. 352* 
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Financial Group and the Economic Group led respectively by 
Jacob Viner and Alvin Hansen. Significantly, in 1939 
Viner became an adviser to the Treasiiry Department and 
Hansen was put in charge of postwar plaurining at the Federal 
llQ 
Reserve Board in Washington. Through numerous memoranda, 
the Financial and Economic Groups jointly developed an 
economic strategy to counter the threat posed to world 
peace by a German-dominated Europe. In the development of 
this strategy the "Grand Area” concept was established. This 
area comprised nations which, when bound together in an 
economic bloc, provided a measure of self-sufficiency 
greater than that achieved by the Germans in Europe. To 
achieve this degree of self-sufficiency, the Grand Area 
would have to include all of the non-German dominated world 
with the exception of Russia. Although the Grand Area was 
envisaged to satisfy American aims under diverse situations, 
perhaps the most significant was developed under the hypoth- 
esis of an Anglo-American victory over Germany. In this 
situation. 
During an interim period of readjustment and recon- 
struction, the Grand Area might be an important 
stabilizing factor in the world's economy. Very likely 
the institutions developed for intonation of the 
Grand Area would yield useful experience in meeting 
48 
Laurence A, Shoup, "Shaping the National 
Interest: The Council on Foreign Relations, the Department 
of State, and the Origins of the Post War World 1939-19^3#" 
(Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 197^)» P* o6. 
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European problems, and perhaps it would be possible 
simply to interweave the economies of European co\intries 
into that of the Grand Area, Above all, if the United 
States and Britain wish to ensure a durable peace on 
lines they believe desirable, an economically integrated 
Grand Area will be important to them, as a basis of 
power, and a useful instrument for adjusting difficul- 
ties.^9 
Achieving the Grand Area concept was not an easy 
task. As stated in one CFR memorandum, 
Prom our point of view, the inclusion of Britain within 
a preferential system of which the United States will be 
an important part is required, economically speaking, as 
it is the most important market for the agricultural 
surpluses of the temperate climate countries of the 
Western Hemisphere and the Far East. It would perhaps 
not be far wide of the mark to say that, if the British 
Isles were excluded from this area, Argentina-Uruguay 
and Australia-New Zealand would have to be excluded, 
were a like degree of complementarism to be obtained in 
any smaller area than the grand area. Or put the other 
way around, the tropical sections of the Western Hemi- 
sphere and Asia are highly complementary to the United 
States, whereas the temperate climate areas are highly 
complementary only with Britain.50 
However, in an insightful comment, it was also recognized 
that, 
. . . American and British interests are neither 
identical nor entirely parallel. Not only will there 
be disagreements as to what policy is best, but also 
real clashes of interest which can be resolved only to 
the hurt of certain groups within one or the other 
coimtry. In war-time the tendency is for such clashes 
^The Library, Arthur Upgren and William Diebold, 
"Methods of Economic Collaboration; Introducing the Role 
of the Graind Area in American Economic Policy”, 24 July 
1941, Studies of American Interests in the War and Peace. 
Economic and Financial Series, No. E-B34, p. 4. 
^^The Library, Arthur Upgren, "Problems of Bloc 
Trading Areas for the United States; Intra-Bloc Preferential 
Tariff and Other Devices for Encouraging Economic Integration”, 
Studies of American Interests in the War and Peace. Economic 
and Financial Series, No. E-B31, p. 3. 
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of interest to be submerged and subordinated to the 
single goal of winning the war.51 
As early as July 19^1 the War and Peace Studies committee 
stressed the necessity of international institutions that 
would have the purpose of ” . . . stabilizing CTirrencies 
and facilitating programs of capital investment for con- 
structive undertakings in backward and underdeveloped 
regions.By November 19^1 this program had widened to 
encompass the more developed nations as well.^^ In February 
19^2, Viner suggested the establishment of two financial 
institutions. One would be concerned with the stabilization 
of exchanges and the other would act as an international 
bank fon short-term transactions that were not immediately 
Ch, 
connected to stabilization.^ This appears to have been the 
first written reference to two separate institutions to 
handle the postwar economic problems. 
Owing perhaps to bickering within the Department of 
State-^^, the Department's leadership in postwar economic 
^^Arthur Up^en and William Diebold, "Methods of 
Economic Collaboration, . . . p. 5* 
^^Shoup and Minter, p. l66. 
p. 167. 
p. 168. 
^^See Ferrell, (ed.), The American Secretaries of 
State and Their Diplomacy, vol. 12, and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., 
A Search for Solvencys Bretton Woods and the International 
Monetary System. 1Q4I-1971» (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1975), p. 41. 
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planning began to wane visibly by the end of 1941. The 
Treasiiry Department, however, was more than willing to 
assert its leadership in planning for the postwar period. 
Harry Dexter White was not as well known internationally 
as his illustrious British counterpart, Keynes, but he was 
j 
nevertheless an adept economist. With Viner's assistance. 
White had received his first special assignment with the 
United States Treasury in September 193^« Although this 
was a temporary appointment, it began his long career in the 
civil service.During his appointment to the Treasury in 
the 1930*3, White demonstrated his appreciation for Keynesian 
concepts.Even though the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau, was not one of the Keynesians in the Treasury, 
he was very impressed by White's organizational and technical 
skills.. As a result, Morgenthau gave White responsibilities 
that exceeded his official position in the Treasury. In 
December 1941, White was given full responsibility for the 
Treasury's share in the conduct of foreign affairs and was 
also given the same authority as the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury.White did not betray his superior's faith 
^^Officially White was not classified as a civil 
servant until January 1942 but he was well established in the 
Treasury long before this. See David Rees, Harry Dexter 
White? A Study in Paradox. (New Xorks Coward, McCann and 
Geoghegan, 1973)» PP* 43-44. 
^"^David Rees, p. 64, 
^^Morgenthau was not entitled to assign the official 
title to White, only the responsibility. See Rees, p. 13I. 
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in him. By the end of December 19^1» White had produced a 
general statement entitled "A Suggested Program for Inter- 
Allied Monetary and Bank Action.In April 19^2 he 
completed a "Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations 
Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- 
opment of the United and Associated Nations"^^ which was 
more detailed than his December draft. This version called 
for separate institutions, one to handle the stabilization 
program and one to act as a world bank. The President was 
given this latter document aroimd the middle of May. Sub- 
sequently, Roosevelt suggested that the Secretairy of the 
Treasury discuss future developments with the Secretary of 
state. The result was the formation of a Cabinet Committee 
which first met on 25 May and the consolidation of experts 
within the American Technical Committee. Dean Acheson, 
Adolf Berle, Herbert Peis, Leo Pasvolsky, and Alvin Hansen 
were all involved either on the Cabinet Committee or on the 
Technical Committee. White and his assistant, E.M. Bernstein, 
oversaw and led these committees in developing an American 
Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary 
Fund 19^5-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary 
Cooperation, vol. 1. Chronicles. (Washington: International 
Monetary F\md, 1969), p. 12. 
Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary 
Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary 
Cooperation, vol. 3. Document^ (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, 1969), pp. 37*^2. 
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postwar economic plan.^^ 
Dtiring the winter of 1942 Keynes and other United 
Kingdom officials met with the Americatn Ambassador, J.G. 
Winant, whose staff had been bolstered with economic advisers, 
to discuss economic plans. Although specific reference to 
the respective plans was avoided, both the Americans and the 
British likely knew the general tone of the others intentions. 
An actual exchange of plans took place during the summer 
of 1942 and Keynes and White met briefly in the fall of that 
year. By the end of November 1942, the American plan had 
become more detailed as to the composition of the Fund and 
its operation. This particular version of the White plan, 
was redrafted three times in December and three times in 
January 1943..^^ A draft entitled "Preliminary Draft of 
Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization 
Fund", dated 24 December 19^2, was almost identical to the 
one distributed to the United Nations in April 19^3* 
In a memorandum attached to the December 1942 version 
of the American plan, the author presented his objectives. 
The memorandum explicitly recognized three inseparable 
monetary problems which the Stabilization Fund was designed 
^^Shoup, "Shaping the National Interest:", p. 23O. 
62 
J. Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary 
Fund 1945-196 Twenty Years of International Monetary 
CoQ-peration. vol. 1. Ctoonicles. (Washington: Intemational 
Monetary Fimd, I969), p. 31. 
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to meet; ”to prevent the disruption of foreign exchanges, 
to avoid the collapse of some monetary systems, and to 
facilitate the restoration and balanced growth of international 
trade.Although the Keynes and the White plans had this 
similar purpose of promoting the expansion of trade, the 
two plans differed on how best to attain this. Unlike 
Keynes, who saw liquidity as the major obstacle to trade 
growth and thus proposed a new international currency. 
White saw no such need for a new currency. White reasoned 
that 
the value of any currency in terms of any other currency 
was a consequence of a complex of monetary and economic 
forces, [and] changes in these forces influenced the 
value of one currency in terms of others. The adoption 
of a new international currency would not modify these 
forces one whit.o^ 
White identified the monetary problems of the interwar 
period with the flight of capital, the high rate of inflation, 
and the consequent disruption of foreign trade which resulted 
from unstable currencies.Consequently, the American 
technical experts stated that: 
By providing stable currency and removing the fear of 
sudden changes in exchange rates, the Fund will contribute 
to the revival of international trade and the res\imption 
°^PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "A Stabilization 
Fund of the United and Associated Nations”, 16 December 19^2. 
^^Horsefield, vol, 3, p. ?8. 
^^Ibid., p. 
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of international investment. With international 
cooperation on exchange policy it will he possible to 
avoid the ’beggar my neighbour’ tactics of the 1930’s 
which contributed to the spread of depression from 
country to country.oo 
The December 1942 version of the White plan thus stated that 
the value of the currency of each member coimtry could not 
be altered without the permission of the Fund.^*^ 
An interesting aspect of the December memorandum 
was that the statement of objectives largely paralleled the 
economic war aims stated earlier by the CFR. This memorandum 
stated that the Stabilization Fund plan was presented as an 
important factor in winning the war. The Stabilization 
Fund could achieve this desired objective since 
. . . the task of assuring the defeat of the Axis powers 
would be made easier if the victims of aggression, 
actual and potential, could have greater assTirance that 
a victory of the United Nations will not mean in the 
economic sphere a repetition of the exchange instability 
and monetary collapse that followed the last war.68 
Indeed, the White plan could facilitate the development of 
^®PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Replies to 
Questions on the International Stabilization Fund Which 
Have Been Submitted by the Experts of Various Governments 
Participating in the Technical Discussions in Washington”, 
May 19^3, p.. 32. 
®'^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Preliminary 
Draft Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabili 
zation Fund”, 16 December 1942, Section III(2). 
^®PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "A Stabili- 
zation Fund of the United and Associated Nations", I6 
December 1942. 
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the Grand Area concept. Even within the title of the plan 
the term ’United and Associated Nations* suggested this. 
’United* referred to the belligerents in the war against 
the Axis powers and ’associated nations’ referred to "nations 
which have broken diplomatic relations with the Axis . 
[in which] eventually neutrals [also] may be taken in, and, 
6Q 
with the passage of time, possibly even enemy countries.” ^ 
That is to say, the plan encompassed the entire world. 
There were no provisions for currency or trade blocs like 
those contained in the Clearing Union. In fact, the White 
plan was directly linked to the multilateral trade objectives 
stated in the Lease-Lend Agreement. Article VII of the 
Lease-Lend Agreement of 19^2 stated that the primary 
objective would be; 
. . directed to the expansion, by appropriate 
international and domestic measures,, of production, 
employmentr and the exchange and consumption of goods, 
which are the material foundations of the liberty and 
welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms 
of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, 
and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers . . .71 
^%AC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Fund Proposals”, 22 April 
19^3. P. 2. 
"^^See "Replies to Questions . Question ?• 
'^%aster Lend-Lease Agreement; Preliminary Agree- 
ment Between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
February 23» 19^2, in A Decade of American Foreign Policy; 
Basic Documents. 1941-49. vv, 3-5. 
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While the British and Americans were negotiating the terms 
of Lease-Lend during the summer of 19^1» Keynes had, as 
reported by a later observer, 
. » . frightened top officials of the State Department by 
hinting that the postwar era might compel Britain to 
resort to far more stringent and discriminatory trade 
control to save its depleted financial resources. As a 
result, Welles, Hull and other American officials 
determined to obtain British endorsement of their sharp- 
ened economic peace aims as the price of American support 
during the war, thus compelling the Americans to define 
these aims more explicitly.72 
Consequently the White plan committed member countries ”to 
abandon , all restrictions and controls over foreign 
exchange transactions (other than those involving capital 
transfers) "to maintain by appropriate action 
exchange rates established by the fund on the currencies of 
9il 
other countries , ; and "not to enter upon any new 
bilateral foreign exchange clearing arrangements except with 
the approval of the Fund."*^^ 
Unlike the Clearing Union, the White plan was founded 
on a subscribed capital basis. Most projections of the 
postwar economic situation assumed that the United States 
would be the only major creditor coimtry. To safeguard the 
^^Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War; The World sind 
United States Foreign Policy. 1943-19^^. (New York: Random 
House, 19^8), p. 24o. 
"^^"Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United and 
Associated Nations Stabilization Fund", l6 December 19^2, 
Section V(2). 
Section V(l). 
Section V(4). 
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United States against enormous liability as a creditor 
nation, the subscribed capital was to total approximately 
$5 billion and the American share of this total fund would 
be approximately $2 billion. The determination of the $5 
billion total was revealed in a report by American technical 
experts s 
. . . based on the view that resources of this magnitude 
would be adequate for the needs of member coxintries for 
foreign requirements recognized as legitimate. The 
resources of the Fund are to be used by member countries 
primarily to meet adverse balances of payments on current 
account ... It should be recalled that the Fund is not 
designed to provide the resoxxrces needed for relief and 
rehabilitation, or for reconstruction and development. 
While resources will be needed for these purposes, they 
should be provided from sources other than the Inter- 
national Stabilization Fiind.7o 
Apart from the desire to limit the function of the Stabili- 
zation Fund, the subscribed capital principle also placed 
limits on the extent to which debtor countries could draw 
on the Fund. Although these two aspects of the subscription 
principle were related, they differed in one major respect. 
When a country's balance of payments was persistently in 
disequilibrium, certain monetary and/or trade adjustments 
must be instituted to restore equilibrium. White feared 
that " a fund with larger resources may result in the 
excessive postponement of necessary adjustments, [and] neither 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Replies to 
Questions on the International Stabilization Fund which have 
been submitted by the experts of various governments 
participating in the technical discussions in Washington”, 
May 19^3. pp. 75-76. 
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this fxmd or any f\md can meet the unlimited demands of all 
countries without the application of restraints demanded by 
77 
underlying circumstainces. ' 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Fund Proposals”, 22 April 
19^3. P. 2 
CHAPTER IV 
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CANADA 
Before the United States declared war on Japan 
and Germany, Canada played an instrumental role as the 
^linchpin* between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However, once the United States entered the war in December 
19to as a belligerent, this role was lost since the United 
States and Britain no longer felt it necessary to operate 
through a third party. In the realm of economic policy, the 
resulting tendency to. negotiate bilaterally between the 
United States and the United Kingdom had unique repercussions 
to Canada. As the United States became increasingly involved 
in international affairs, American officials continually 
pressed for the ”... abolition of import discriminations 
as an essential objective for workable post-war economic 
95 
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arrangements.'*^ These principles were embodied in Article 
VII of the Lease-Lend Act which was signed by the United 
States and United Kingdom on 23 February 1942. On the 
other side of Canada's economic triangle, the United Kingdom 
was reluctant to accept the American proposal to abolish 
import discriminations because " it implieifd] the 
ultimate abandonment of the right of Empire countries to 
2 
grant each other exclusive trade preferences." Although 
Canada had a vested interest in maintaining and perpetuating 
trade preferences, the Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Norman Robertson, maintained that Canada had ". 
a greater interest in supporting the main objectives of the 
American international economic policy."^ American officials 
affirmed their recognition of "... the primary importance 
of increased economic activity, both national and internation 
al,- in employment, production, consumption and exchange of 
goods." Canadian officials favoured these objectives not 
only on their own merits but also because Britain was favour- 
ing a trade policy which would restrict Canadian exports. 
\ 
^Norman Robertson, "Memorandum from the Under- 
secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister", 
30 December 19^1» in John F. Hilliker (ed.). Documents on 
Canadian External Relations, vol. 9, 1942-1943^ (Hull: 
Minister of Supply and Services, I98O), (Hereafter Documents, 
vol. 9), Doc. 559» P- 604.- 
4 ✓ ✓ 
Ibid., p. 606. 
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Even though the Canadian Department of External Affairs 
had been *• • . • worried about the disposition on the part 
of the United States to determine, by bilateral negotiations 
with the United Kingdom,, questions of policy intimately 
affecting us"^, the Under-Secretary of State cautioned 
against raising objections to either the British or the 
Americans. Robertson believed that there existed ” a 
considerable block of opinion in the United Kingdom ready 
to see these negotiations fail, and to ascribe the United 
Kingdom* s inability to reach agreement with the United States 
to the paramotmt necessity of preserving preferential trade 
relations with the Dominions."^ Although Canadian officials 
did not relish bilateral settlement of trade policy between 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the prospect that 
Britain would diverge from the American objective of freer 
trade was even more abominable. Canadian officials were 
convinced that only-small gains would accrue to Canada under 
a preferential trade system. These officials were, also 
aware of the importance to Canada of attracting Britain 
into a multilateral system. 
The problems that arose from the bilateral negoti- 
ations between the United States and the United Kingdom 
were almost immediately perceived by Canadian officials. In 
98 
January 19^2 Rasminsky observed that: 
. . , it was necessary on several occasions to put in 
a word for Canada and other small coimtries. When the 
word was put in, it was generally assumed that at least 
Canada, and probably other Dominions as well, should be 
made a party to any discussions which took place now or 
later, but it seems to me that it will be necessary for 
us to put forward our claims to be represented so that 
our views receive adequate consideration.7 
The fact that the United States and Britain had a tendency 
to discuss postwar economic problems while excluding other 
nations had a particularly unsettling effect on Canada whose 
interests were so inextricably interwoven with these two 
great Anglo-Saxon nations. However, only a few months after 
Rasminsky observed with some irritation that the British and 
the Americans tended to decide policy matters between them- 
selves, Canadian officials began to fear that Britain and 
the United States were drifting away from one another, 
particularly on economic issues. A telegram sent from Lord 
Cranborne, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
dated 23 May 1942, gave a brief outline of American economic 
planning to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
W.L. Mackenzie King: 
We think it probable that the United States experts will 
wish to discuss the use of particular devices such as 
protective tariffs, preferences, import quotas, anti- 
domiping duties, export subsidies, centralized purchase 
of staple commodities and bilateral payments agreements. 
7 
'PAC, Deputy Minister's Office, Department of Finance, 
RG19, vol. 3977* file E-3-l(3)* Louis Rasminsky, "Meeting of 
Cotincil on Foreign Relations, New York, January 24, 1942," 
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Whether the amhitious schemes mentioned above are 
adopted or not we think it doubtful whether we or many 
other countries could afford entirely to forego all such 
forms of trade without grave risk of economic and finan- 
cial collapse and without reversing the probable trend of 
our domestic social policy 
This telegram to the Canadian authorities demonstrated two 
aspects of British policy-making. First, and more obviously, 
the British did not agree with the United States experts on 
the issues closely associated with multilateral free trade 
practices. The second aspect was merely implied in the 
telegram. The implication was that British officials assumed 
Canada’s compliance with their objection to the abolition of 
trade devices proposed by the United States, Although this 
lack of appreciation of Canadian interests by the British 
should not have surprised Canadian officials, it nevertheless 
complicated an already difficult task of bringing about a 
resolution between the United States and the United Kingdom 
that was satisfactory to Canada. It was with this telegram 
in mind that Robertson wrote to Clark on 2k May stating, ”I 
have been wondering whether, in light of this new development, 
we should review again the Joint Economic Committees* abortive 
recommendation of last winter about Canada-United Kingdom- 
United States economic collaboration.”^ As previously stated, 
^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3989, file T-2-9-2, Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 23 May 19^2. 
^Ibid., Norman Robertson to William Clifford Clark, 
2k May 19^2. 
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Canadian officials were reluctant to press for Canada's 
involvement in the negotiations between the United States 
and the United Kingdom as long as they developed satisfac- 
torily. However, the prospect of an outcome satisfactory 
to Canada emerging from these bilateral negotiations was dim. 
Consequently, Canadian officials reconsidered becoming in- 
volved in a trilateral cooperative effort in which Canada 
would not simply mediate the differences between the United 
States and the United Kingdom but give voice to Canadian 
interests. 
Providing a forum in which Canadian interests would 
be given due consideration by the United States and the 
United Kingdom proved to be a formidable task for Canadian 
policymakers. Many countries had come under the Lease-Lend 
umbrella and the United States used this agreement as a 
means of establishing postwar economic collaboration. Article 
VII of the Lease-Lend Agreement, which committed the signatory 
governments to the principles of free trade, was seen as a 
quid pro QUO for Lease-Lend supplies.Canada was reluctant 
to join the ranks of Lease-Lend countries because the advan- 
tages of doing so did not out-weigh the disadvantages. Since 
Canada did not receive any benefits from Lease-Lend, Canadian 
^^Jay Pierrepont Moffat to Normam Robertson, "Memo- 
randum of Conversation with Mr. Norman Robertson, Under- 
secretary of State for External Affairs", 2 October 19^2, 
in Documents, vol. 9, Doc. 568, pp. 618-19. 
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officials hesitated to sign an agreement which in principle 
was equivalent to Article VII. Among those countries sub- 
scribing to Article VII, Canada alone would concede abandon- 
ing preferential trade practices while receiving none of the 
Lease-Lend benefits in return. However when the United 
States increased its pressure on Canada to sign Article VII 
of the Agreement in the fall of 1942, Canadian officials 
tended to interpret this overture as an attempt to give 
Canada an entry into postwar economic collaboration. This 
was certainly the meaning which Mackintosh attached to it 
when he wrote "... we caui think of this exchange of notes 
as a means by which a country not a Lease-Lend recipient may 
be brought into discussions which, technically, will occur 
ouir of Lease-Lend agreements. It seems to me highly probable 
11 that this is actually in the mind of the State Department," 
Canadiain officials decided that Canada should sign 
if for no other reason than to avoid being excluded from 
further postwar talks. However, they felt that Canada 
should press for more concrete proposals than a simple state- 
ment of principles offered by the United States. In early 
October Robertson sought the opinion of influential Canadian 
officials on how to achieve the most appropriate response 
to this American overture. Rasminsky responded by claiming 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3977, file E-3-I, W.A. Mackintosh 
to Norman Robertson, 6 October 1942. 
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that Canada should " propose immediate agreement on 
a long range programme of action designed to give practical 
effect to the general principles incorporated in Article VII 
Rasminsky had in mind involved the progressive reduction of 
tariffs over a ten year period. While this arrangement 
would he worked out hy Canada and the United States, Rasminsky 
thought that 
... it would he better to work towards an arrangement 
under which the proposed Canadian-Americain treaty would 
he a keystone in a series of similar arrangements between 
Canada and the United States on the one hand aind other 
"like-minded” countries on the other hand. To accomplish 
this we might propose that this treaty he negotiated now 
hut that it enter into force when Canada aind the United 
States have concluded similar treaties with the other 
countries which have signed Mutual Aid Agreements with 
the United States.i3 
Rasminsky was firmly committed to lower tariffs and freer 
trade. His great fear was that postwar unemployment would 
influence countries to pursue policies of high tariffs which 
" . . . we will spend the decade after the war regretting and 
trying unsuccessfully to lower." But there was no guarantee 
that the Canadian Government would agree to this long range 
programme, let alone achieve agreement with the United States 
Government. This explained Rasminsky's conviction that the 
and the draft American note." 12 The long range program 
12 
Itid., RasminsSsy to Norman Robertson, 6 October 
19^2 
103 
time to act was while the war raged. Without the pressing 
problems of unemployment and while the spirit of inter- 
national cooperation resulting from the exigencies of war 
continued, governments were more likely to commit them- 
selves to this type of action. Nevertheless, Rasminsky 
noted that, ” if in fact it is going to be impossible 
for the United States to have a liberal commercial policy 
when the war is over, then the sooner that fact is made 
clear the better for all concerned.This sense of urgency 
in binding the United States to a firm committment to liberal 
trade practices dominated Rasminsky*s decision-making. 
But the CanadiaLn officials had apparently misread 
ther signals emanating from the United States State Department. 
Following talks with Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Minister of the 
United States, Robertson wrote that the United States 
government 
. . . was most anxious to keep the general language of 
the proposed agreement with Canada in exact conformity 
with the iMguage used in the comparable agreements with 
others of the United Nations. They thought of the present 
agreement with Canada as completing a series and not 
an instrument in which they could .break new ground.lo 
The United States obviously had its own ideas on pursuing 
postwar economic planning. Whether the United States had 
considered collaborating with both the United Kingdom and 
19^2. 
Norman Robertson to Towers, 21 November 
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Canada was unknown to Canadian officials. In any event, as 
far as Canada was concerned, this collaboration was desir- 
able and not something Canada was willing to forego. Al- 
though Cainada had close contacts with officials in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, there remained a 
growing need to have a trilateral agreement rather than 
separate bilateral agreements. Canada agreed to sign the 
American proposal because, as Clark stated, ” further 
delay would probably hinder us in endeavouring to discuss 
these matters jointly with the United Kingdom and the United 
States rather than independently. 
Britain had arranged for representatives of Common- 
wealth coimtries to meet in London in late October 1942 in 
order to discuss postwar financial planning, Canada welcomed 
the invitation to discuss these issues but was reluctant to 
participate since these talks could be interpreted as an 
” e . . attempt to confront United States representatives 
in later talks with a common Commonwealth front.** Through- 
out these discussions, the Canadian representatives repeat- 
edly stated that any document should remain solely a United 
^"^Ibid., William Clifford Clark to Norman Robertson 
(no date). 
^®PAC, RG19, vol. 3989, file T-2-9-2, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs^ 3 October 1942. 
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Kingdom dociiment and not carry any implication that it had 
the approval of the Canadian Government. Canadian officials 
not only wanted to maintain a free hand in subsequent 
discussions but also wanted the United States to know that 
Canada did not automatically act in accord with Britain. 
This was important to Canada because she found herself in 
closer agreement with the United States on economic matters 
than she did with Britain, As early as 23 May 1942, the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs wrote to his Canadian 
counterpart that " the Clearing Union would be a centre 
round which other international agencies would gather. It 
would provide convenient means for financing post-war relief, 
international development schemes and commodity control 
schemes,The Canadian representatives at the October 
Commonwealth discussions voiced their disagreement with 
attaching these schemes to the Clearing Union. The reason 
given for the disagreement was that these schemes.were not 
necessary and their close association with the Clearing 
Union might imperil the much needed financial organization. 
The Commonwealth meetings began on Friday, 23 October, 
but, owing to wartime transportation difficulties, the 
arrival of Canadian representatives was delayed. Although 
a brief discussion was held on the Friday, the substantive 
^^Ibid., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 May 1942, 
para, 4. 
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talks were postponed until Monday when the Canadiains would 
he able to participate. Throughout these discussions, 
indirect references occurred to American postwar economic 
planning. It is uncertain whether the other Dominion repre- 
sentatives knew of the American plan hut the Canadian repre- 
sentativesi definitely had prior knowledge of it. Sir 
Frederick Phillips of the United Kingdom Treasury stated 
that, although " . ► it had heen hoped that the United 
States would send senior officials to London for a preliminary 
examination of these problems, nothing had come of these 
aspirations." Phillips* definition of the term 'senior 
officials* is enigmatic. Phillips and Keynes had met in 
London earlier in the month to discuss the currency plans 
with the American Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, 
and his assistant, Harry Dexter White. Perhaps instead of 
’senior officials’ he had in mind plenipotentiaries. Never- 
theless, the British were vague whenever the subject of 
American attitudes towards postwar economic planning was 
raised. 
Throughout the latter part of 19^2 and the early 
part of 19^3» Canadian officials were extremely sensitive 
to the direction that discussions on postwar economic policy 
should take. While in London during October 1942, Hume Wrong, 
^°BCA, LR76-188-33, "Post War Economic Talkss Draft 
Minutes of Second Meeting 26 October 1942". 
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now Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
and Rasrainsky called on the American Ambassador, J.G. Winant, 
in an attempt to ascertain what path the Americans were 
likely to follow. In the course of this meeting Winant 
indicated that there was a considerable difference of 
opinion within Washington as to how the United States should 
proceed. Winant probably had in mind differences of opinion 
between State Department officials and Treasury Department 
officials. On 10 July 19^2, some Treasury officials, notably 
White, had recommended the scheduling of a conference of 
thirty-six countries of the United Nations to discuss post- 
war economic plans but had been blocked by the State Depart- 
21 
ment.^ Whitens desire for such a conference was revealed 
when he reportedly remarked that ” . all the brains were 
not concentrated in two great powers and . . . many of the 
smaller countries might have an important contribution to a 
discussion of this type.” As a result of the impasse on 
how to proceed with the discussions, a scheduled meeting of 
British and American representatives was postponed. With 
the American elections so close at hauid, it was felt best 
21 See Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency; 
Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 19^1- 
1971. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975)» PP* 61-62. 
^%>AC, RG19, vil. 3981, file M-1-7-2, W.C. Clark, 
"Stabilization Fund Plan”, 9 April 19^3. 
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to hold a meeting sometime after Novemher to avoid any undue 
controversy or publicity. When asked by the Canadian 
representatives what course he thought these proposed 
discussions should follow, Winant suggested that it was 
necessary that the United Kingdom and the United States reach 
an initial agreement. Winant did not disclose whether he 
had in mind agreement of a general statement of principles 
or agreement on a specific plan. Once this agreement was 
attained, the next step would be discussions with the other 
allied countries. Although Winant sympathized with Wrong's 
remgirk ” , that it was very important to avoid any 
impression of an Anglo-American diktat,the American 
Ambassador did not seem to think that an Anglo-American 
agreement presented to the allied countries would appear as 
a diktat. 
Wrong and Rasminsky were more concerned about an 
Anglo-American agreement, not because of the impression it 
would leave but rather because they were all too familiar 
with lack of consideration for third party interests, par- 
ticularly Canada's, when sin economic agreement was reached 
between these two countries. The Canadian delegation were 
optimistic that the United States would be sensitive to the 
repercussions of an Anglo-American agreement. A memorandum 
LR76-I88, Rasminsky's notes on talks with 
American Ambassador. 
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in Rasminsky’s possession, entitled "Progress in the War 
of Ideas", and clearly of American origin suggested that 
Our intentions should he put forward not as Americsin 
ideas and not even as Anglo-American proposals hut 
rather as the joint intentions of the United Nations. 
This is necessary if the danger of suggestions about 
American imperialism or if an Anglo-American hegemony 
are to he avoided.24 
Canadian officials did not want to he party to any American 
ploy. The involvement of the United Nations, however, 
suited Cainadian aspirations about the discussions of postwar 
economic solutions. 
While in London the Canadian representatives also 
discussed with Sir Frederick Phillips and Sir Wilfred Eady, 
Second Secretary of the United Kingdom Treasury, the direct- 
ion the British were likely to take. In his report on 
this meeting, Rasminsky noted that the British considered 
the Americans to have erected a major obstacle to the 
successful resolution of future Anglo-American discussions. 
This obstacle was identified as being the American insistence 
on placing commercial policy at the forefront of postwar 
economic discussions. The British not only did not want to 
give priority to commercial matters but they also disapproved 
of American commercial policy which demanded substantial 
reductions in preferential trade practices. The British 
maintained that commercial policy could only be discussed 
^^BCA, LR76-188, "Progress in the War of Ideas", n.d. 
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after international financial arrangements had been resolved. 
The United Kingdom wanted to be assured that " . ► there 
would be an expansionist international system'*before 
signing any specific trade agreements. As a result, the 
United Kingdom Treasury intended to forge ahead with the 
Clearing Union plan: ** ^ , they felt that this was the 
central part of the post-war picture and other matters could 
26 
only be dealt with intelligently in relation to it." 
There was merit both in the American insistence on 
placing commercial policy ahead of financial arrangements 
and in the British refusal to do so. The Americans were 
not willing to provide credit for foreign reconstruction 
efforts only to find that American producers were being 
denied international markets. On the other hand, Britain 
was unwilling to foreswear restrictive trade measures if the 
international financial arrangements adopted were not going 
to be conducive to expanding international trade. With this 
impasse in the development of the discussions, Rasminsky 
suggested that W.C. Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, 
and Graham F. Towers, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, 
27 
might be useful in "bringing about a meeting of minds", ' 
^%CA, LR76-I88, Rasminsky, "Report on London Trip", 
10 November 1942. This report was based on a meeting on 
9 November 1942 with Sir Frederick Phillips and Sir Wilfred 
Eady. 
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since both Clark and Towers had cultivated good relations 
with officials in the American Treasury. Clark particularly 
had achieved a close relationship with Morgenthau and White. 
It appeared to Rasminsky that Phillips heartily agreed with 
his suggestion. 
Keynes had also become concerned about development 
of the discussions. After receiving Phillips* observations 
on the American attitude towards the discussions to this 
point, Keynes noted that ” the meeting at the State 
Department on 26th November to consider our replies suggests 
pQ 
a very harmless, indeed, almost too harmless an atmosphere." 
After considering the problem, Keynes suggested that the 
best method by which to proceed had appeared earlier in a 
report by the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, 
following his conversations with the American President on 
21 April 1941. According to Halifax, Roosevelt had argued 
that the " . . . best way of preparing for post-war economic 
matters on the economic side would be to appoint a joint 
Anglo-American Commission of small numbers to prepare some 
ideas for the consideration of the two Governments."^^ Keynes 
believed that "this procedure would perhaps lift the whole 
matter out of the rut, prevent it from getting bogged down 
pQ 
Keynes to Phillips, I6 December 1942, in Collected 
Writings. vol. 25» p. 197• 
29 Ibid., p. 202, 
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and give it a more authoritative position.Keynes 
believed that the Foreign Office would welcome the suggestion 
and would likely advise the Foreign Secretary to approach 
the Prime Minister with it. Usually well informed on American 
policy Keynes was, nevertheless, unaware that a change had 
occurred in official circles in Washington with respect to 
postwar economic plsinning. Phillips was stationed in Washing- 
ton, however, and was more sensitive to the changing direc- 
tions of United States foreign policy. Phillips noted that 
Keynes* suggestion ” . . - may have had good points in 19^1 
but we are not in 1941.In 1941 the United States was 
not yet leading in the war effort and in postwar plainning, 
therefore the Americans might have agreed to a joint Anglo- 
American Commission. By the end of 1942, however, the 
American government had assumed a leading role in the war 
effort and strove for the same in postwau: planning. 
The American elections brought renewed tensions in 
the already strained Anglo-American relationship. The 
November elections saw the isolationist Republicans swell 
the ranks of Congress at the expense of their internationalist 
Democratic colleagues. Although these isolationists differed 
from their interwar counterparts, they nevertheless remained 
suspicious of entangling the United States in the web of 
p. 203. 
^^Phillips to Keynes, 8 January 19^3. Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» p. 205. 
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the British Empire.One of the first indications of this 
renewed tension was recognized at an Institute of Pacific 
Relations Conference held in Ottawa in December 19^2. Ras- 
minsky, who attended it, wrote his superior, Graham Towers: 
”as you know I returned in a pretty gloomy frame of mind. 
This was largely due to the obvious lack of imderstanding 
between the British and the Americans,Rasminsky blamed 
this lack of understanding on the poor prospect for future 
American participation in international schemes: ” in 
one or two cases, this was no doubt a reflection of the 
isolation of the participants but in other cases it appeared 
to be an appraisal of trends in American public opinion and 
'XIL 
was no doubt largely influenced by the November election."^ 
Rasminsky also noted that the British did little to allay 
American suspicions of British colonial policy.This re- 
sistance to cooperation with the British, exacerbated by 
the American elections, made the possibility of an Anglo- 
American diktat very unlikely. 
^^iscount Halifax to Mr, Eden, "Political review of 
the United States for the Year 1942", 26 June 1943r in Thomas 
E. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches: Analysis of America by 
the British Ambassador. 1939-194^. (Evanston, 111.; New 
University Press, 197^)• 
^%CA, LR76“l89r Rasminsky, "Mont Tremblant Conference? 
Memorandum to the Governor [of The Bank of Canada]", n.d. 
^^Rasminsky to Hume Wrong, 16 December 1942, in 
Documents, vol. 9, Doc, 839, pp. 1004-05. 
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In preparation for discussions with the United 
Nations, White had drafted a new version of the Stabilization 
Fund plan which contained more detail on the operations and 
management of the F\ind than his earlier drafts. This 
version of the White plan met with sharp criticism in both 
Canada and the United Kingdom. British officials were taken 
aback by it because they were expecting further American 
comments on the Clearing Union plan. However, this criticism 
was, for the most part, not aimed at the Stabilization F\ind 
plan per se but at the finality which this version suggested. 
The American and British proposals, while differing somewhat 
in form, had been similar in general principle. As a result, 
it appeared that agreement could be reached on these shared 
principles. Owing to the depth of detail of this version of 
the White plan, it now appeared that the Americans were less 
inclined to negotiate the format of their plan with the 
British on a strictly bilateral basis. This suspicion was 
confirmed when Assistant Secretary of State Berle informed 
Phillips that the United States was planning to send the 
White plant 
... to the United and Associated Nations a little 
later with the suggestion that they, in the not too 
distant future, send one or more of their technical 
experts to Washington to give us their preliminary re- 
action as to the draft proposal, and discuss with our 
technical experts the feasibility of international 
monetary co-operation along the lines suggested in those 
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documents or along ainy other they may wish to suggest.^ 
British officials were reluctant to agree to this procedure 
as they still felt an Anglo-American agreement should be 
reached before other nations were brought directly into the 
discussions. Phillips offered his view of the problems that 
were likely to arise in a hypothetical description of dis- 
cussions involving several parties: 
there would be an official or unofficial or semi-official 
Russian wise man, ditto Chinese wiseman [sic], with 
Canada squawking across the Border, and London insisting 
that Van Zeelaind shall be on to represent Europe and why 
should the I.L.O. and the League be ignored? . . . The 
dilemma is that you must have a team from each country 
for no one man can cover the ground* But it is hardly a 
workable idea to have a team from each of several 
countries to draft plans.37 
The British authorities raised objections to the American 
suggestion of involving other nations ostensibly because 
there was not enough time to review the American document. 
Out of deference to the British objections, the United 
States agreed to delay their schedule and even agreed to 
meet with British officials first. 
Curiously, by 24 February 1943, the British had 
reversed their criticisms of the United States proposal to 
3®PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, Adolf A. Berle 
to Sir Frederick Phillips, 1 February 19^3• 
^*^Phillips to Keynes, 8 January 1943» in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25, p. 205. 
3®PAG, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, Phillips to 
R. Gordon Munro, n.d. A copy of this telegram was sent to 
W.C, Clark by Munro on I9 February 1943. 
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present their plan to the United and Associated Nations. In 
fact, a telegram from the British Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs to the Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs claimed that the 
. . . best course would he for experts from United 
Nations concerned to he invited to Washington as soon 
as possible to discuss main points of difference between 
the two drafts. We have asked Phillips to put the 
suggestion to the United States authorities in discussing 
with them their ideas as to future procedure and will -g 
telegraph further as soon as their reactions are known. 
Perhaps this change of heart was related to Britain's desire 
that, as Keynes mentioned in a later letter, the United 
States *• * . . should become aware of the world-wide 
preference for C.U. .[ Cleairing Union] A world-wide 
preference for the British plan would compel the Americans 
to make drastic revisions to their plan. 
Canadian officials had a natural predilection for 
any proposal which would bring the United Nations into the 
discussions. A memorandum entitled "Current Anglo-American 
Relations", which was drafted on the basis of discussions 
held in Ottawa on 6 and 7 February 19^3» reported that 
Canadian participants suggested that " the United 
Kingdom and the United States should discuss large issues 
of public policy with other members of the United Nations 
^^Ibid., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 February 1943- 
^^Keynes to Phillips, 2? May 1943» in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» p. 282. 
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most concerned present, rather than in. formal conversations 
from which all other coijintries were excluded," The 
rationale behind this approach was that it provided Canada 
with an opportunity to influence British and American deci~ 
sions so that Canadian interests could be better served. The 
Canadians were pleased to see the American suggestion of 
1 February as it suited their preference for further discus- 
sions. However, the British insisted on presenting their 
Clearing Union plan to the United Nations, which complicated 
the course Canada would like the discussions to take. Clark 
in particular did not like to have the United States and the 
United Kingdom each submitting its own plan for discussion as 
. . . this put the two drafts into competition with each 
other and would embarrass a good many Governments which 
might prefer the British draft but would be very reluc- 
tant to state their views frankly lest they offend the 
United States Government whose cooperation was essential 
if we are going to have any kind of international mone- 
tary cooperation. 
Clark argued that " , the best approach would be not to 
have the experts debate the differences between the two 
plans, but rather to have them use the United States draft 
as the basis of discussion which should afford opportunity 
for debate on any amendment which any nation may wish to 
propose." A debate on the two plans would drive the 
4l 
BCA, LR76-I89-67, "Current Anglo-American Relations? 
Discussions in Ottawa, February 6 and 7, 19^3”* n.d. 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, W.C. Clark to 
Norman Robertson, 6 March 1943. 
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British and the Americans fiirther away from a negotiated 
settlement. However, Clark knew full well the implications 
behind accepting the American draft as the basis for 
discussion. The subscribed capital principle, the heart of 
the American plan, would be accepted while the essential 
banking principle of the British plan would be disregarded. 
Clark had a formidable reputation in Ottawa both as a civil 
servant and as an economist. Clark's rejection of the 
Clearing Union principle, therefore, suggested that he pre- 
ferred the American plan because of its economic advantage 
for Canada. 
A telegram to the British Government from the Secre- 
tary of State for External Affairs tactfully communicated 
Canada's desire that a conference of experts of the United 
Nations should consider both plans with the objective of 
settling on one plan. Similar to Clark's earlier suggestion 
of avoiding a direct confrontation of the two plans, this 
telegram airgued that 
... in order to avoid the appearance of competition 
and of differences of principle we feel that the best 
method of approach would be not to debate the differ- 
ences between the two plans but to take the United States 
plan as the basis for discussion. The United Kingdom 
would naturally reserve the right to suggest changes in 
the United States draft which would bring it closer to 
the Clearing Union plan.^^ 
L/L 
Ibid., Secretary of State for External Affairs to 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 9 March 19^3. 
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In response to this suggestion by the Canadiain Secretary of 
State for External Affairs about taking the Americain plan as 
the basis for discussion, the British indicated that they 
still hoped to have further discussions between Phillips and 
the American experts to clarify some "obscure” points in the 
Stabilization Fundi plan. Furthermore, the United Kingdom 
officials regarded; it as premature to decide that the 
American plan should be the only basis of discussion before 
such clarification! took place. The British were not 
anxious to relinquish the essential banking principle while 
the Americans were equally adamant that an Anglo-American 
diktat not be presented to the nations of the world. 
As compromise between the United States and the 
United Kingdom became increasingly doubtful, the hope of an 
international order satisfactory to Canada also became 
increasingly dim. The prospects of a satisfactory settlement 
took a turn for the worse in the last half of March.. On 
15 March the Secretaiy of State for Dominion Affairs informed 
his Canadian counterpart that sections of the Clearing Union 
document had been leaked to the British press and, as a 
result, United Kingdom officials felt constrained to publish 
their plan. Until this juncture, the proposals for postwar 
economic solutions had for various reasons been kept out of 
the public eye. Technical experts, civil servants, and poli- 
^^Ibid., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 March 19^3* 
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ticians alike tended to consider that the general public 
had neither the prerequisite knowledge nor the desire to 
give fruitful thought to certain complex fields of endeavour 
such as international economics. Clark demonstrated that 
he concurred with this consideration when he once claimed 
that "foreign exchange seems to me to be accepted by the 
public as sufficiently esoteric to concern them only slight- 
ly. To his credit, Keynes had persistently main- 
tained that, before enlightened international schemes could 
be accepted, the public mind would have to be educated. Al- 
though the Keynes and White plans had many differences in 
form, they had similar objectives which had not yet been 
presented by the public. Publication of the plans would 
help in the educating process but the danger of the British 
and American plans being in competition with one another was 
increased. Once they were in the public domain, the plains 
would inevitably be affected by political considerations. 
However, when the press procured the Clearing Union docximent 
the decision to publicize the proposals became a moot point 
for the United Kingdom. The British officials gave notice 
to the United States that they were compelled to publish 
their plan. Under these circumstances, the most Britain 
could hope for was an agreement by the United States to pub- 
lish their plan also. If the British plan alone were known, 
^^Ibid., W.C. Clark to J.H. Williams, 21 August 19^3 
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it alone would come under severe criticism as there would 
he no indication that such principles had become internation- 
ally accepted by many experts. The Americans, on the other 
hand, could defer publication, discern the form of the public 
criticism, and then tailor their plan to meet these criti- 
cisms. The result would be that their plan would be the 
more palatable of the two. Strategically, delaying publica- 
tion was an adroit decision. The United States government 
in fact served notice on Britain that it was not yet ready 
to publish its plan and asked that any reference to it be 
avoided. 
Curiously, in spite of this pronouncement by the 
Americans, the British Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs wrote that "simultaneous publication of both plans 
47 
may however be possible." ' The Canadian officials regretted 
that the Clearing Union plan had to be published but hoped 
"that it will be found possible to arrange for simultaneous 
48 
publication of the United States Stabilization Fund Plan." 
They were well aware of the barriers that could arise to a 
settlement satisfactory for Canada when the British and the 
Americans felt compelled to assume antipodal attitudes toward 
economic issues. If public scrutiny of the proposed plans 
47 
^Ibid., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 March 1943. 
48 
Ibid., Secretary of State for External Affairs to 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 19 March 1943. 
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were inevitable,, then simultaneous publication was to be 
favoured. The 5 April 19^3 issue of the London Financial 
News unexpectedly contained a full summary of the White plan. 
With the American plan public, the United Kingdom felt 
confident in publishing its plain on 7 April. Much to their 
irritation, the United States was compelled to publish the 
White plan on the same day. Although simultaneous publication 
of the two plans kept the British at the negotiating table, 
it did so at the price of deepening the tensions that existed 
between the two nations. 
Prior to the publication of the two plans, the United 
States had made arrangements to begin bilateral discussions 
with the various members of the United and Associated Nations. 
The discussion to be held with Canada was scheduled for 21 
April but, owing to the publication of the plans, Canadian 
officials once again attempted to temper the worsening climate 
in Anglo-American relations. When Clark met with White on 
6 April, the day after the Financial News printed a summary 
of the White plan, he considered proposing an informal dis- 
cussion between Canada, the United States, aind the United 
Kingdom. However, White expressed the American irritation 
at being forced to publish their plan and reiterated American 
reluctance about the United Kingdom and the United States 
getting together to agree upon a plan. Consequently, Clark 
felt it wiser to refrain from making the proposal until a 
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later date. While in Washington Clark also had a chance to 
talk with Phillips. During the course of this conversation 
Clark speculated that the dialogue between the United States 
and the United Kingdom was "not likely to get anywhere. 
Phillips appeared to concur with Clark*s observation that 
an impasse had developed between the two countries: "Phillips 
read cables which he received from his own Government, the 
gist of which was that if I could suggest a workable pro- 
cedure they could be content.Clark then suggested that 
perhaps the best procedure would be to have J.L. Ilsley, 
the Canadiain Finance Minister, write to Morgenthau to suggest 
"an informal conference of experts preferably in Ottawa and 
in the week beginning April 19. ^t»51 Phillips liked 
this suggestion as " . ► the letter to Mr. Morgenthau 
would get the issue above the heads of the experts concerned 
and probably to the President himself. and a confer- 
ence in Ottawa in the week of April 19 would give time to 
study the public reactions to the plans. . . Clark 
promptly contacted Ilsley who forwarded the proposal to 
Morgenthau on 8 April. In his confidential dispatch, Ilsley 
put forward the Canadian suggestion for a tripartite confer- 
^%bid., W.C. Clark, "Stabilization Fund Plan", 
9 April 19^3* 
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ence as delicately as possible? 
It would not be the object of such informal discussions 
to develop immediately a common plan, but rather that 
there should be an exploration of the contributions 
which certain features of each plan might make to the 
solution of the essential problems and of the lines of 
discussion which might be followed most usefully with 
other countries if the desired result of final agreement 
is to be achieved.53 
This letter demonstrated the extent to which Canada had 
become concerned about deterioration of Anglo-American 
relations. Earlier in the year Canada had been in favour 
of discussions along the lines preferred by the Americans but, 
by April, they preferred an Anglo-American-Canadian confer- 
ence^ Canadian officials were faced not only with bringing 
officials from the United States and the United Kingdom 
together, but also with ensuring an active role for Canadian 
participation in the planned discussions. However, finding 
common ground for Britain and the United States was a diffi- 
cult and arduous task. Morgenthau rejected Ilsley's overture 
and, as Phillips wrote to Keynes, . . . it is difficult 
to be optimistic at present as to the future of post-war 
planning.Informal discussions among eighteen countries 
were slated for 15-17 June. As D.H. Robertson of the United 
Kingdom Treasury commented, however, 
of course it will be a ridiculous gathering, but it is 
evidently quite hopeless to get White to agree to a 
■^^Ibid., J.L. Ilsley to Morgenthau, 8 April 1943* 
^^Phillips to Keynes, 22 April 1943, in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25, p. 249. 
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small hand-picked meeting which could really get down 
to it. So one can only hope that at least the party 
will do no harm and (no doubt over-optimistically) that 
there may be something to drink.55 
•^^orman Robertson to Sir Wilfred Eady, 3 June 19^3» 
in Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 291. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CANADIAN PLAN 
Canadian officials had sensed worsening Anglo- 
American relations at the end of 1942, It was to he expected 
that Canada would attempt to mediate between the two North 
Atlantic partners. A.F.W. Plumptre, an economist stationed 
at the Canadian Legation in Washington, was particularly 
sensitive to the state of Anglo-American relations. Comment- 
ing to Clark on the arrested development of economic policy 
between the British and the Americans, Plumptre had suggested 
that a third plan, drafted by a Canadian, could prove useful 
since 
. . . three or more plans put forward for discussion 
would . . . focus attention on the broad differences of 
the various plans and therefore on the broad principles 
which ought to underlie the plans. It would divert 
attention from the details of the several plans - which 
is just what seems to me to be necessary at this 
juncture.1 
^PAC, RGI9, vol. 39^1f file M-1-7-2, Plumptre to 
W.C. Clark, I6 January 19^3* 
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Clark was in complete agreement with this suggestion of 
playing down the differences between the two plans. However, 
Plumptre was not interested in a Canadiain plaui that would 
offer a workable synthesis of the Americaui and British 
plans. Nor was he concerned about a Canadian plan that 
would necessarily embody characteristics of specific interest 
to Canada. Plumptre*s notion of the main purpose behind a 
Canadian plan was to "divert attention away from details," 
The Canadian plan would include details only to the extent 
that " . .if the Canadian plan merely consisted of a few 
broad suggestions, it would appear too obvious that we were 
2 
only putting up a straw msin for a special purpose." Plump-^ 
tre’s initial reaction to the Stabilization Fund was that 
" . it is economically and financially ingenious, although 
there are certain points which are debatable"^, but he pre« 
ferred the Clearing Union proposal and assumed a Canadian 
plan would more closely resemble that than the American plan. 
In reflecting on the development of the Canadian plan long 
afterward, Plumptre wrotes 
It was most important . . . that the compromises should 
not flounder, as had the League of Nations, on the rock 
of the U.S. Congress. It was this factor, rather than 
lack of sympathy for the more imaginative and far reach- 
ing plans of Lord Keynes and his colleagues, that led 
Canadians to advocate positions that, on the whole. 
^Ibid. 
^PAC, Ibid., Pliunptre to W.C. Clark, 8 December 19^2. 
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4 
seemed more American than British. 
In this almost apologetic tone, Plumptre reiterated his 
personal preference for the Clearing Union plan. Whether 
Plmnptre based his preference on the advantages which he 
perceived the British plan to have for Canada is unclear. 
It is possible that Plumptre made his choice on the basis of 
a colonial relationship that, if still in existence, was in 
decay. This relationship placed Canada within the orbit of 
the British Empire. One commentator claimed a few years 
later that, ”if at the Ottawa Conference, as some believed, 
the vision of an Imperial zollverein began to take form, by 
1939 in Canada, in any case,, it had faded from view perhaps 
forever. 
The reason this vision of an Imperial zollverein had 
faded from view in Canada was owing to a change in the United 
Kingdom’s economic relationship with Canada. In the fiscal 
year' ending 1938, approximately two-thirds of Canada’s raw 
and partly manufactured goods were exported to the United 
Kingdom.^ The importance of this to the Canadian economy as 
4 A.F.W. Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision; Canada 
and the World Monetary System. (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1977 5» P• 29. 
■^Douglas Rudyard Annett, British Preference in 
Canadian Commercial Policy. (Toronto; Ryerson Press, 1948), 
p. 91. 
^The Library, Arthur Upgren, "Canadian-United States 
Economic Problems: Problems of Economic Integration of 
Canada and the United States", 11 February 1941, Studies of 
American Interests in the War and Peace. Economic and Finan- 
cial Series, No. E-B25. 
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a whole was seen in the fact that this export accounted for 
almost 28.5?S of Canada's total exports. In terms of balan- 
cing Canada's import-export trade, the export of raw and 
partly manufactured goods to the United Kingdom represented 
37• 8^ of the total value of Canadian exports to the United 
Kingdom. However, imports from the United Kingdom amounted 
to only 18.1^ of Canada's total imports. Although fully 
manufactured goods represented approximately two-thirds of 
Canada's total imports, the United Kingdom supplied only 
24.7^ of these. If Britain felt the need to secure export 
markets through bilateral agreements, Canada would be vulner- 
able to British pressure. Should Canada be forced to turn 
away from the United States as a source of manufactured goods, 
the consequences would be extreme:ly disruptive to the Canadian 
economy. This disruption would occur because, as the source 
of Canada's, imports changed from the United States to the 
United Kingdom, the direction of Canada's exports would 
increasingly change as well. Of Cainada's exports to the 
United States, 38.4^ consisted of fully manufactured goods 
and constituted 46.4^ of Canada's total fully manufactured 
exports. Given the experience of the early 1930*s, it was 
unlikely that Britain would be interested in this component 
of Canadian exports.*^ While it was possible that Canada 
*^R.F. Holland, "The End of an Imperial Economy: 
Anglo-Canadian Disengagement in the 1930*s”* Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 11 ^983):159-174. 
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could have increased its agricultural exports to offset the 
loss in manufactured exports, it would not have been desirable 
to do so. The importance of a manufacturing sector to the 
Canadian economy was expressed by Clark when he noted that 
... in the time of depression the prices of raw mater- 
ials and foodstuffs fall very rapidly, far more rapidly 
than the prices of manufactured goods. Thus at the 
turning point from boom to depression the value of 
Canada's exports tends to fall off suddenly and rapidly 
while the value of her imports tends to keep up for a 
time.® 
Canada had been increasing her manufacturing sector^ and 
was willing to protect it because, among other things, it 
was important as a buffer against the deflating value of 
primary goods. However, the industrialization that had devel- 
oped in Canada was '* . , in response to external demands, 
with the result that Canada is probably more dependent 
than ever upon external markets for maintaining a high level 
Q 
W-C.^ Clark, "Should Canada be Forced to Liquidate 
Her Holdings of United States Securities?”, April 19^1, in 
Documents, vol. 8, pt. 2, Doc. 188, p. 137• 
^The growth in Canada's industrialization can be 
traced into the interwar period, 1925-1929f when the "annual 
net value of manufactures increased almost $600 million or 
by approximately fifty per cent.” From John A. Stovel, 
Canada in the World Economy. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 195^)f P* 222. Similarly, in 1939 3?aw materials 
accounted for only twenty-six per cent of Canada's total 
exports (as compared to 50-60^ before WWl) and approximately 
thirty-three per cent were partly manufactured and forty-one 
per cent fully manufactured. See A.K. Harvie, "Financing 
Canada's International Trade," in J.F. Parkinson, ed., 
Canadian Investment and Foreign Exchange Problems. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 19^0), p. 35* 
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of employment of her productive resources . 
Should Britain refuse Canadian imports because it 
could not find a reciprocal outlet for its exports, Canada 
would have to find another export market. Indeed, this was 
the fear expressed by the Deputy Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, Dana Wilgress. Following a meeting with Clark 
and Wilgress in October 19^2, the American Ambassador to 
Canada recorded that Wilgress had pointed out that '* ^ 
Britain by buying or not buying great bulks of wheat from 
Canada had a leverage on Canadian national economy for 
which she could extract almost any amount of concession, 
Since Wilgress had also noted that the British ” , evinced 
considerable worry over the extent of Canadian industriali- 
12 
zation during the war”, one of the concessions Britain would 
likely attempt to extract from Canada would be to reduce 
the amount of manufactured goods exported from Canada, The 
United States would seem like a natural alternative for 
Canadian exporters. However, based on trade statistics for 
1937r American import requirements would account for only 
^C.D, Blythe, "Some Aspects of Canada's International 
Financial Arrangements”, Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 12 (August 1946):302. ~ 
11 Naincy Harvison Hooker, The Moffat Pacers; Selec- 
tions from the Diplomatic Journal of Jay Pierre-pont Moffat. 
1919-1943r (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, I956), 
p. 386. 
12 Ibid., p. 387. 
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about 38^ oi* Cainada’s total exports. Thus the United States 
was not in itself a sufficient outlet for Canadian goods. 
Attempts in the early 19^0*s to expand Canadian trade to 
Latin American countries had been rebuffed by the United 
States. Consequently, if Canada were to maintain the level 
of manufactured exports, the triangular pattern of trade had 
to be preserved. 
However, in his January letter, Plumptre implied 
that a relationship akin to an Imperial zollverein was still 
an important factor in determining Canadian policy when he 
made an observation concerning the American Treasury Depart- 
ment's attitude towards Canada; ” . the Treasury and 
particularly one inmate of it, likes to think that we in 
Canada are highly independent of the British.This was 
an interesting statement since the two great concerns in 
Canadian-American relations had initially been to convince 
the United States that Canada was independent of Britain 
and, later, to convince the Americans that Canadian inter- 
ests could not be assumed to be identical to those of the 
United States. If convincing the Americans of Canada's 
independence from Britain was difficult, convincing the 
British of Canada's independence was almost impossible. For 
his part, Plumptre made the task no easier. During a 
conversation with Edward W. Playfair, an official with the 
^%AC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2. Plumptre to 
W.C. Clark, I6 January 19^3* 
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British Treasury, Plumptre suggested ” . . that we 
Canadians are in this matter raairching in step with the 
British. 
Plximptre, however, was not the only Canadian who had 
close contacts in the British Treasury. Keynes had written 
to Hxime Wrong to keep him abreast of the developments in 
Britain and to suggest the possibility of creating a synthesis 
of the Clearing Union and Stabilization Fund plans. Keynes 
wrote; ”I am convinced that such a synthesis is possible 
and very possible that you in Canada might use your good 
offices to put forward something on these lines.Keynes 
recognized Canada as the best mediator since ** ... . the 
Canadians have been more successful than any other as inter- 
viewees in getting to grips, partly because they are not so' 
unduly nervous about how to handle the American Treasury sind 
partly because they are exceptionally well informed on these 
matters.By creating a synthesis of the two plans, Keynes 
seemed to have had in mind a synthesis that was developed in 
close association with the British. 
The letter by Keynes which suggested that Canada 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981» file M-1-7-2, Plumptre to 
W.C. Clark, 12 February 19^3- 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-1, Keynes to 
Wrong, 19 May 19^3- 
^^Keynes to R.H. Brand, 9 June 19^3* in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» p. Z8k, 
might play an instrtimental role in providing a synthesis 
of the two plans Wrong forwarded to Clark with the comment, 
”his letter reads as though he was not familiar with the 
discussions on this point that we have had with Phillips. 
In fact, Phillips and Clark had had several discussions on 
the best way to achieve a satisfactory compromise between 
the two plans. Phillips* view was that Canada ** should 
produce an independent scheme which would lean more in point 
of form to S.F. than to C.U. but would nevertheless involve 
substantial changes in S.F.” However, Phillips* view of 
an "independent scheme” was that ” . [the British] must 
and ought to know the main and essential features of any 
scheme you propose to put forward.Phillips probably 
desired to have Britain informed in advance so that they 
20 
would have the opportunity to influence the final text. 
Phillips had also encouraged Keynes to work on a plan that 
might make the Stabilization Fund more acceptable. If the 
Canadiain and British schemes showed ”... a substantial 
^'^PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, Wrong to 
W.C. Clark, 31 May 19^3. 
^®PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, Phillips to 
W.C. Clark, 5 June 19^3* 
^%bid. 
20 In fact, when the Canadian plan was presented in 
advance the British retorted, **We judge Canadian draft 
certainly not acceptable unless ...” RGI9, vol. 3982, 
file M-l-7-^f Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
High Commissioner for United Kingdom in Ottawa, 12 Jime 19^3• 
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measure of agreement,, it might be practicable for us to put 
forward a scheme to the Americans which would stand as a 
basis for final settlement, assuming we are going to get one 
21 
at all.” But presenting the United States with a scheme 
concocted by Britain and Canada was antithetical to the 
course Canada desired for future discussions. Not only 
would Canadian interests be lost in a British scheme but 
Canada would find herself on the side of those with whom she 
had the least common interest. 
In a memorandiam to the Prime Minister, Mackintosh 
outlined several reasons which were compelling Canada to 
22 
submit its own plan at the upcoming discussions. The 
intent, of this memorandiim was to win government approval to 
present a Canadian plan and not to gain approval for the 
plan itself.The tone of the memorandum was therefore 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, W.A. Mackintosh, 
"Proposed steps in the Future Discussions of the Clearing 
Union and Stabilization Fund Proposals”, 2 June 19^3- 
^^Granatstein suggests that the Cabinet War Committee 
had 'adopted* the Canadian plan on 2 June, f The Ottawa Ment 
The Civil Service Myidarins, 1Q35"19*37. (Toronto: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1962), p. 161.] but in fact, the War Cabinet 
Committee only ”... approved participation of Canadian 
representatives in the Washington discussions, and the pre- 
sentation thereat by Canadian representatives of specific 
proposals, it being understood that the proposals so presented 
would in no way commit the government.” (Extract from Minutes 
of Cabinet War Cpmmittee 2 June 19^3, in Documents. vol. 9, 
Doc. 593*) Indeed, as late as 11 June the Committee ”... 
agreed that, in view of the fact that the proposals would be 
presented in such a manner as to avoid any commitment on the 
part of the government, it would not be necessary to have them 
submitted to or examined by the War Committee.” (Extract from 
Minutes of Cabinet War Committee, 11 J\ine 19^3» Documents. 
vol. 9, Doc. 596. 
136 
biased towards the conciliatory character of the plan rather 
than its representation of Canadian interests. Winning the 
government's approval to present the plan was a formidable 
task. King, well known for his cautious nature, was unlikely 
to back a proposal that would arouse opposition. In his 
diary King recorded that "I took exception to calling the 
plan of some of the financial experts: Clark, Towers, and 
Robertson. They had drawn up, on international finance, 
a Canadian plan. I am sure a large section of the H. of C. 
r - 24 
[House of Commons] would not wish it so named." Mackintosh, 
likely anticipating his leader's hesitance at sanctioning a 
Canadian plan, therefore appealed to King's impression of 
Canada's general station in the triangular relationship 
between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Aspects of the plan which would not find enthusiastic support 
were evaded. Mackintosh appealed, instead, to the perception 
that Canada was independent of both the United States and 
the United Kingdom - "Our suggestion, if put forward as a 
whole in an integrated plain, will make clear that we are 
neither pro-London nor pro-Washington,He also appealed 
to the 'Linchpin' concept: "A Canadian plan would bring 
ok , 
The Mackenzie King Diaries. 2 June 19^3* 
RG19, vol. 398L, file M-1-7-2, Mackintosh, 
"Proposed Steps in the Future Discussions of the Clearing 
Union and Stabilization Furid Proposals", 2 June 1943. 
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discussion into the open auid probably establish some merger 
26 
of the two plans as to the desirable model.” Finally, he 
appealed to the perception of Canada's special relationship 
vis-a-vis the United Statess "It [a Canadian plan] would 
give rise to no instinctive opposition such as the British 
plan. 
While elements of the above were legitimate rational- 
izations for presenting a Canadian plan. Mackintosh obscured 
the real reason by exaggerating their importance. This was 
clear in his claim that Canada has ” an almost embar- 
rassingly high position in banking and financial circles in 
the United States and is not without reputation in Con- 
gress. . A Canadian plan would probably attract more 
28 
support in the United States than a Treasury plan.” It 
was surely unlikely that Congress would accept a Canadian 
plan without consideration of its content, simply because it 
was drafted by Canadians.. But Mackintosh was not the only 
civil servant who projected such an exaggerated view of the 
purpose behind the Canadian plain. Many of the argtiments 
used in Mackintosh's memorauidum seem to have originated 
with Clark. By presenting this distorted picture of the 
Canadian plan, the experts revealed their predilection for 
giving direction to Canadisui foreign economic policy. After 
^^Ibid. 
^'^Ibid. 
^®Ibid. 
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the War Cabinet Committee met with the financial experts. 
King recorded that "there is a great danger of members of 
the permanent service trying to frame policies and make 
members of the government their mouthpiece instead of members 
of government shaping policy and members of the service 
carrying it out.If King had no other exceptional qual- 
ities, he was certainly perceptive. 
The Canadian plan that was presented diiring informal 
discussions in mid-June of 19^3 was based principally on the 
American plan.^^ That is, it employed the subscribed capital 
principle and generally followed the White plan more than 
the Keynes plan. J.L. Granatstein has suggested that the 
main reason for the similarity of Rasminsky's plan to White's 
was fear that the American Congress would object to a new 
international financial scheme.Although an American plan 
would be more palatable to Congress, Granatstein believed 
that the United States would only be willing to accept a 
plan that did not risk American capital. Although some 
Canadians who were involved in the discussions, including 
Plumptre, took this view, Granatstein suggests that Canada 
^%he Mackenzie King Diaries. 2 June 19^3 
^^Por further analyses of the similarities between 
the two plans see Lawrence F. Mansfield, "The Origins of the 
International Monetary Fxmd", (Ph..D. dissertation. University 
of North Carolina, i960), p. 261. 
^^J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, pp. l46- 
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adopted the American format with the simple purpose of 
enticing an isolationist Congress into a world organization. 
While that was a noble endeavour, it was not the only 
reason for adopting the American format nor was it the most 
important. 
The main reason behind the adoption by Canadian 
officials of the subscribed capital principle lay deeper 
than concern about the United States Congress. Rasminsky 
felt that the ” banking principle is much neater and 
more beautiful than the ftmd principlebut he found merit 
in the fund principle because 
. . . the capital subscription provides the Fxmd with 
foreign exchauige. [And] at a time when the United States 
dollar supply of the Fund is exhausted, the Fund would 
not owe the United States money as a creditor. [Insteadl 
its debt would be to the United States as a stockholder.^ 
Similarly, Rasminsky had noted that the Clearing Union's use 
of overdrafts was as foreign to Canadian banking as it was 
to American banks.The essential reason for the subscribed 
capital principle was not to win Congressional approval but 
to place constraints on the liabilities of the member coun- 
tries. However, Rasminsky argued that "there is much to be 
^^CA, LR76-206, Rasminsky to Keynes, 3 June 19^3. 
^^BCA, LR76-206, "Notes on White Plan", 25 Jainuary 
19^3- 
Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods; Birth of a 
Monetary System. (New York: Holmes aind Meier Publishers, 
1978). p. 82. 
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said for not applying the restraints or pressures, on either 
the debtors or creditors, too soon or too abruptly. He 
nevertheless concurred with the American experts that it 
would be 
. . . extremely dangerous to use the extension of short- 
term credits as a continuing device to cover up unso\md 
positions . . . [since] No debtor country can live be- 
yond its resources in perpetuity; aind no creditor country 
can persistently refuse to lend its surplus abroad or 
make other adjustments to its creditor position without 
ripping the international fabric.3° 
Granatstein has asserted that "White's plan, 
with its fund limited to $5 billion for all members, was far 
too small in toto and equally skimpy as an American contribu- 
tion to the reconstruction of the world. Moreover, he 
has suggested that "Rasminsky doubled the size of the fund 
to $10 billion, to be raised from each member . . .How- 
ever, Granatstein has misconstrued the intention of the $5 
billion limitation as well as muddled the character of the 
Rasminsky draft which he claims "doubled the size of the 
fund". It is beyond question that $5 billion was too little 
for the "reconstruction of the world"; however, the fund was 
^%AC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Proposals", 22 April 1943. 
^SAC, RG19, vol, 3982, file M-1-7-2, Rasminsky, 
"Plans for Post-War Monetary Organization", n.d., p. 7; 
Rasminsky sent copies of this memorandum to Clark, Mackintosh, 
Deutsch, Bryce, and N.A. Robertson on 20 May I943 (BCA, 
LR76-211-6). 
^"^Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 147. 
^®Itiid. 
1^1 
not designed to finance the reconstruction of the world. 
One of the basic differences between the British and American 
proposals was that the British wanted to include reconstruc- 
tion schemes within the monetairy organizations of the 
Clearing Union while the Americans believed these schemes 
were best left to separate organizations. The Canadians 
agreed with the Americans on this particular point. The 
$10 billion provision in the Rasminsky draft, which Granat- 
stein claims "doubled the size of the Fund", also misrepre- 
sents the development of the Canadian plan. In the draft 
referred to, Rasminsky based the plan on the simple mechanism 
found in the Clearing Union.That is, it was based on the 
essential banking principle and not on the subscribed capital 
principle. The figure of $10 billion in the Rasminsky draft 
was in reference to aggregate quotas and not to subscribed 
capitals " . . . the aggregate quotas shall not be less than 
. LQ 
$10,000mm." However, xinlike Keynes who would require one 
coxmtry to be liable for the aggregate quota, Rasminsky 
placed a limit on the " . . , obligation to accumulate inter- 
41 
national currency" which limited any one country's stake to 
an amount equivalent to its quota. Although Rasminsky also 
introduced an initial gold contributipn, this was only equal 
^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3447; file 'International Clearing 
Union', Rasminsky, "United Nations Currency and Stabilization 
and Clearing Fund", n.d. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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to twenty percent of a member’s quota and was inserted 
simply to '* . lessen the stake of the creditor cotintries 
in the plan as [the gold contribution] will be at the dis- 
. 42 posal of these countries in the event of liquidation. '* 
Once a limited liability was accepted, Rasminsky noted that, 
. . . there is really no very important difference, 
other than esthetic difference, between the two meth- 
ods. ... If one assumes, as one must, that the United 
States would insist on a limit on the amount of resources 
she is willing to provide through the new institution, 
then the banking principle is not in itself necessarily 
more expansionist than the fund principle.^3 
Although Rasminsky refrained from indicating that Canada was 
in complete agreement with the Americans on limiting the 
resource of the Fund, it should not be assumed that Canadians 
were either closer to Keynes on this point nor more . 
sensitive to American desire for a fund with a limited 
liability because Canada would likely emerge from the war 
44 
as a creditor on current accoxmt. , '* 
Before the plans had been made public, Canadian 
officials endeavoured to determine the intention behind 
certain points in the White plan by posing informal questions 
to the American experts. One of these points concerned the 
significance of the limitation to a $5 billion fimd. The 
Canadians wanted to know if this amount had anything to do 
^^Ibid. 
^%CA, LR?6-212-1, Rasminsky to Keynes, 3 June 1943. 
^^Granatstein. The Ottawa Men, pp. 144-45. 
with the United States participating in an organization of 
this character. The response of the American experts 
was that it had nothing to do with United States participa- 
tion. In fact, the Americans said that they ” . would 
not hesitate to ask Congress to approve larger amounts if 
that were considered necessary." Even though Bernstein 
had claimed that "an examination of the needs, on the “basis 
of the net balance of payments, for the period 193^-39 
47 indicated that this sum would be adequate" , the Canadian 
officials believed that $5 billion was too small for its 
intended purpose. Rasminsky argued that "one of the objects 
of the fxmd should be to avoid what happened during 1936- 
48 38." The Canadians recognized that a limitation on the 
creditor's liability was not only desirable but also would 
not hinder the Fund* s effectiveness in meeting its intended 
purpose. However, the Canadian experts differed from their 
American coimterparts as to what sum should be considered 
an adequate limitation. 
^^BCA, LR76-207-I, Mackintosh to Plumptre, 6 March 
19^3. 
^^BCA, LR76-207-I-3, Plumptre to Mackintosh, 12 March 
1943. This statement, which was made before the plans were 
made public, adds credence to the claim that Congress* 
attitude towards the schemes was not a significant factor in 
limiting the American contribution to the Fund. 
^'^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981. file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Proposals", 22 April 19^3, 
p. 3. 
48 
Ibid., p. 4. 
The assertion that Canada desired a limited liability 
because she would emerge as a creditor nation ignores two 
important aspects. First, Canadian experts believed that 
this creditor position was likely to be only a temporary 
position. To suggest that the Canadians would insist on a 
point that satisfied their needs for such a short time fails 
to credit the expertise which the Canadian officials ex- 
hibited throughout the discussions. Secondly, the Canadian 
experts knew full well that ” the resources provided 
to the Fund are not a contribution a fonds nerdus . , 
In a multilateral system all countries had a keen interest 
in ensuring that each cotintry had sufficient reserves of 
foreign exchange to maintain its trade relationship with 
other members of the system. Canadians were perhaps more 
keenly aware of this than any other nationals. This was less 
the result of ideological tendencies on the part of a few 
Canadian experts than on their practical experience of Cana- 
dian relationships over the years. Unlike the British, who 
could maintain their trade levels within one currency bloc, 
and the Americans, who arrived at multilateral trade as a 
system conducive to world peace, the Canadian desire for a 
multilateral world was based on practical economic experience. 
Consequently, the Canadian experts saw the advantages of pro- 
^%AC, RGI9, vol. 3982, file M-1-7-^, Rasminsky, 
"Plans for Post-War Monetary Organization", n.d., p. 5« 
viding an international monetary organization with adequate 
funds and the disadvantages that would occur if the funds 
allocated were inadequate. At the same time, they were 
also aware of the potential abuse of an unlimited liability 
fund. A country that lived beyond its means had to be 
brought into line or else the abuses of a few delinquent 
countries would cause the entire financial system to break 
down. The Canadian experts were therefore convinced that a 
fund with limited liability but adequate resources could 
best meet the monetary problems that would be likely to 
occur in the postwar period. The main problem was in the 
determination of "adequate resources". 
Although there was virtual worldwide unanimity in the 
belief that the postwar period would see a tremendous dis- 
equilibrium in normal trade relationships, there was much 
speculation as to its precise character. A contemporary 
economist, Norman S. Buchanan, dramatically epitomized this 
speculation; 
No one can delineate the precise state of affairs likely 
to prevail at the conclusion of the present world con- 
flict. The drama is too kaleidoscopic, too much is 
hidden in the wings, and the number of acts is uncertain. 
The best that one can hope for is to distinguish the main 
threads of the -unfolding mystery and to guess the probable 
position of the dramatis personae at the final curtain.50 
Indeed, to a great extent the Clearing Union and the Stabili- 
^^Norman S. Buchanan, "International Investments: 
Some Post-War Problems and Issues", Canadipi Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 10 (May 19^^):139« 
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zation Fund were based on ’guesses* as to the probable 
position of the leading dramatis personae - the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In the middle of February 
1943, Mackintosh constructed two hypothetical situations; 
in one he believed the Clearing Union would work better and 
in the other he saw the Stabilization Fund as better suited. 
In the first model Mackintosh assumed that the creditor 
country’s economy would be depressed while the deficit 
country was at active or full employment. Mackintosh sus- 
pected, and was correct in assuming, that Keynes had a similar 
situation in mind when he drafted the Clearing Union. In his 
memorandum on "Post War Currency Policy”, dated 8 September 
1941, Keynes had harkened back to the Great War when he noted 
that 
the United States never succeeded in effecting the re- 
orientation of her domestic economy required by the 
changed circumstances in which she found herself after 
the last war. Her necessary task after this war will 
be still more severe. The solution involves a serious 
distxirbance to the vested interests both of industry and 
of agriculture of a kind which it would be contrary to 
the political traditions and national customs of the 
country to carry through.52 
The Keynes plan, with its provisions for ciirrency blocs and 
the essential banking principle, would help to insulate 
^^BCA, LR76-2II, Mackintosh, "Notes on Keynes’ Plan 
and Whyte’s [sic] Plan for Exchange Stabilization”, 12 Feb- 
ruary 1943- 
^%eynes, "Post War Currency Policy”, in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25» p. 24. 
Britain from the adverse effects of this American decline. 
As we have seen, the currency blocs of the Clearing Union, 
particularly the sterling area, would strengthen British 
trade in that area and lessen her dependence on the United 
States. A slump in the American economy would thus not he 
felt as severely in the United Kingdom as it would if the 
United States were a more important factor in the United 
Kingdom's foreign trade. In this hypothetical situation, 
American dollars would be scarce since the depressed American 
economy would not buy enough abroad to satisfy the capacity 
of foreign nations to conduct trade with the United States. 
As a result, these foreign nations would be forced to con- 
tract their trade. However, the essential banking principle 
circumvented this problem since the automatic drawing rights 
and the use of an international currency, bancor, eliminated 
the repercussions of a scarce currency. 
In a later paper delivered to a Discussion Group at 
Harvard University on 18 March 19^^, Rasminsky noted that 
one of the reasons the United Kingdom would be more willing 
to borrow from the sterling area than from the dollar 
countries was based on 
... a fear that the United States will not be successful 
in maintaining high employment after the war, and that 
periodic tail-spins in the American economy will not only 
involve repayment difficulties, but will also interfere, 
in a multilateral system, with high employment policies 
148 
in the United Kingdom.53 
However, Rasminsky disagreed with the British apprehension 
of the United States* lack of success, claiming that, 
. . . stripped to essentials, what this argument says 
is that the United States is an unreliable trade partner 
because (1) it cannot be relied upon to manage its own 
affairs in such a wav as to remain reasonably prosperous 
all the time, and (2; it cannot be relied on to adjust 
any unbalance which occurs in its international accounts 
by expanding its imports or otherwise increasing the 
current supply of dollars.54 
Experiences during the war years had convinced many Canadians, 
including Rasminsky, that the United States was sincere in 
its, desire to pursue policies of full employment and expand- 
ing multilateral trade. Canada had a real stake in ensuring 
that the United States did not turn from these objectives. 
If the United States chose another course Canada would find 
herself abandoned at both points in her North Atlantic trade 
pattern. As we have already seen, with existing import and 
export requirements, Canada would be excluded from the ster- 
ling area. If the United States deviated from its multi- 
lateral trade objective, Canada would find herself in competi- 
tion with the United States for many of her export markets.-'^ 
■^^Rasrainsky, "Anglo-American Trade Prospects: A 
Canadian View", in The Economic Journal 55 (June-September 
1945):168. 
, pp. 169-70. 
cc 
^•^The Librany, Arthur Upgren, "Canadian-United States 
Economic Problems: Problems of Economic Integration of 
Canada and the United States”, 11 February 1941, Studies of 
American Interests in the War and Peace. Economic and 
Financial Series, No. E-B34. 
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In the second situation outlined hy Mackintosh, 
he assumed that the creditor country would be at or near 
full employment and the deficit countries ” . fairly 
active and trying to get their economies on a still more 
active basis.Mackintosh realized that full employment 
in the creditor country would help export " . , sufficient 
of its currency for the needs of others"^ , but he also 
believed it to be ” quite possible that the rates of 
exchange and the competitive position of the creditor country 
would be such that the deficit countries would again have 
large over-drafts and the currency of the creditor countries 
be scarce..”-^® Because of the favourable trade position of 
creditor nations, the extension of credit to deficit countries 
prescribed in the Clearing Union plan ” . would not be 
desirable xmless it was assumed that it would necessarily go 
into just the proper increase of prices and incomes to make 
the international adjustment desired.Mackintosh was not 
disposed to concede that chance would ensure the proper 
adjustment. Since the Clearing Union did not ensure such a 
^^BCA, LR76-211, Mackintosh, "Notes on Keynes* Plan 
aind Whyte’s [ sic 1 Plan for Exchange Stabilization", 12 
February 19^3* 
^^Ibid. 
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proper rise in prices and incomes, Mackintosh concluded 
that ”It would be better if measures were pressed on the 
creditor country to facilitate imports, appreciate its 
currency or take other measures which would set up movements 
toward a stable balance.The Scarce Ciorrency clause of 
the White plan provided these measures which ultimately 
affected the levels of prices and incomes, although there 
was controversy over the United States* commitment to such 
measures.^^ 
Although Canadians had no greater insight as to the 
size of an adequate fund, they nevertheless advocated a fund 
that would be somewhat larger than that proposed in the 
American plan. The Canadian experts believed that too 
large a fund was better than a fund which proved to be too 
small. The plan that the Canadiain experts presented at the 
6 2 
June 19^3 discussions possessed a capital base of $8 billion 
as compared to $5 billion in the American proposal. However, 
the Canadian plan gave the Union the authority to borrow 
“^Relating to the Scarce Currency clause, Keynes 
” . . . interpreted it as a half-baked suggestion, not 
fully thought through, which was certain to be dropped as 
soon as its full consequences were appreciated.” Keynes to 
R.F. Harrod, ^ Mairch 19^3, in Collected Writings, vol. 25, 
p. 230. 
°^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3982, file M-1-7-U, Rasmins^, 
"Draft Canadian Proposals for a Foreign Exchange Stabiliza- 
tion Union”, 1 June 19^3» Section 11(1). 
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'*an aunount not exceeding 50 per cent of the quota of each 
member country'*^^, which raised the resources of the Union 
to $12 billion. The United States plan had a provision for 
borrowing but it was not mandatory as in the Canadian plan. 
The American experts had nevertheless attached great impor- 
tance to this provision in their plain and had indicated that 
the United States could lend up to $10 billion. However, 
White had informed Rasminsky that "a provision making the 
extension of loans to the fund mandatory would not succeed 
in the United States. Ignoring American objections to 
mandatory loans, Rasminsky inserted this provision into the 
Canadian plan to make more American dollars available to the 
fund^^ and also to provide more Canadian dollars, Rasminsky 
estimated that Canada would have a favourable balance on 
current accoxmt of approximately $150 million per annum 
while Canada’s quota under the White plan would be only $200 
million,Consequently, ’’when the.fimd’s holdings of Cana- 
11(2). 
°^PAC, RG19» vol. 3981. file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Proposals”, 22 April 19^3» 
p. 8. 
°^Ibid., p. 16. 
^®PAC, RGI9, vol. 3982, file M-1-7-4, "Proposals for 
an International Currency Stabilisation and Clearing Fund", 
n.d.5 See ’remarks* in Section 11(7). 
^"^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Fund Proposals", 22 April 
19^3, P. 5. 
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dian dollars are used up it is likely that Canadian exports 
will fall owing to the inability of other cotintries to pay 
68 for them.” The Canadian plan provided for alterations in 
the quotas but this was for long-term adjustments, while the 
heavy demand for Canadian exports was likely to be of 
relatively short duration. The short-term demand could best 
be handled through the extension of loans which could be 
provided as they were needed. 
Even though the Canadian plan enlarged the capital 
base of the American fund, its ability to meet the postwar 
financial requirements was increased by an even greater 
margin. The American plan had provided for the complete 
liquidation of the blocked balances that had accumulated 
during the war. Since this liquidation would draw upon the 
$5 billion resources of the Fund, the ability of the American 
plan to meet the "normal” requirements of the world’s mone- 
tary needs was lessened. The Canadian plan, however, stated 
that. 
During the first two years of operation the Union shall 
have the right to purchase abnormal wartime balances 
held by member countries in other member countries for 
the national currency of the country selling such bal- 
ances or for exchange needed to meet current account 
deficits in such country’s balances of international 
payments, in amotmts not exceeding in the aggregate 5 per 
cent of the quotas of all member countries.o9 
This provided an assurance that the liquidation of these bal- 
p. 6. 
^^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3982, file M-1-7-^, Rasmins^, 
"Draft Canadian Proposals for a Foreign Exchange Stabiliza- 
tion Union", 1 June 19^3» Section VIII. 
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ances would not obstruct the primary ptirpose of the Union. 
At the end of the two year period, the Governing Board would 
either recommend further liquidation or suggest an alterna- 
tive method of handling the problem. 
While the Canadian suggestion for liquidating blocked 
balances may have made practical sense, there was also an 
expedient reason for Canada to exclude the complete liquida- 
tion of blocked balances from its plan. During the April 
bilateral discussions with the Americans, Rasminsky had 
raised the issue of blocked balances. White responded by 
indicating that the provision, as laid out in the American 
draft, would act as an. incentive to members of the Common- 
wealth, as well as others, to join the Fund; he had pointed 
out that ”... the suggested treatment of blocked balances 
would provide more means of payment for trade and possibly 
enable a higher level of world trade. White had assured 
Rasminsky that he was aware that, ”If the blocked balances 
are used rapidly - the total of which is likely to reach 
$8 to $10 billion - the fund would not be adequate, but 
that ”It should be remembered that the unblocked fsic ] balances 
can be used only for current accoxmt purchases which would 
greatly restrict the possible drain. While Rasminsky 
'^°PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Fund Proposals”, 22 April 
1943, p. 38. 
'^^Ibid., p. 36. 
'^^IPid. 
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had no argument with this, he did raise the issue of Canada's 
decision to extend an interest-free loan of $700 million to 
the United Kingdom instead of holding a blocked balance. 
Rasminsky’s primary concern with the American treatment of 
blocked balances was that, "If it should turn out that other 
coointries are able to saddle their claims on the rest of the 
world, Canada's decision would look, to say the least, like 
a bad choice.The liquidation of blocked balances under 
the Canadian plan would probably not be much different, in 
practice, them their liquidation in the American plan. How- 
ever, the phrasing of the provision in the Canadian plan 
made it explicit that such blocked balances would not be 
automatically liquidated► The interest-free loan to Britain 
would thus be protected against critics. 
One of the most^ important features of the Canadian 
plan concerned Canada's ability to offset her deficit in 
American dollars with her surplus of sterling. The Clearing 
Union proposal, with its provision for control of capital 
movements, disturbed Canadian officials. If Canada were to 
enjoy a surplus on current accotmt transactions, she would 
simply possess a credit balance with the Union. This credit 
balance could only be used for current account transactions. 
That is, it could not be translated into a capital accoimt 
transaction as in the pre-war days when a trade surplus re- 
73 Ibid., p. 37. 
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suited in a^movement of gold. Keynes saw the control of 
capital as preventing '* . the withdrawal of this pur- 
chasing power from circulation for the exercise of a defla- 
tionary and contractionist pressure on the world as a whole, 
74 including in the end the creditor coimtry itself.'*' However, 
it also reduced Canada's ability to reduce its indebtedness 
by using the surplus on current account to repatriate foreign- 
held Canadian securities. 
One purpose of the control of capital movements was 
to stop speculative flights of capital while allowing move- 
ments that would ** help to maintain equilibrium, from 
surplus countries to deficiency countries. Perhaps what 
Keynes had in mind, as he had noted a few months before 
drafting the Clearing Union plan, was that •* . interna- 
tional capital movements would be restricted so that they 
would only be allowed in the event of the country from which 
capital was moving having a favourable balance with the 
country to which they were being remitted. In other words 
they would only be allowed when they were feasible without 
upsetting the existing equilibriiim. The restrictions on 
capital movements envisaged in the Clearing Union plan would 
74 
' J.M. Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union", para. 9» in Collected Writings, vol, 25. 
*^%bid., para. 33* 
Keynes to F.T. Ashton-Gwatkin, 25 April 19^1, 
in Collected Writings, vol. 25» PP. 16-1?. 
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require exchange controls at both the importing and exporting 
ends of the movements.This was an effective format as 
both the importing and exporting countries would have to 
agree to the movement in order for it to take place. 
The issue of exchange control was never very clear 
in discussions on the Clearing Union. Because of American 
reluctance to agree to exchange control, Keynes and others 
thought that " the question of capital control should 
not be put in the forefront but should emerge at a later 
stage out of other discussions. Consequently Bryce 
believed that ”... this whole proposal leaves open the 
question of policy with regard to exchange control. . - 
indeed the function of this Union might make it more possible 
to dispense with control over capital movements than other- 
wise. Bryce did not know that Keynes disagreed with him 
on dispensing with capital controls in the Clearing Union. 
A colleague of Keynes*, R.P. Harrod, had similar views as 
Bryce on the use of capital controls. In response to Harrod*s 
views, Keynes wrote, ”I disagree most strongly with your 
view that the control of capital movements may very possibly 
Keynes, "Proposals for an International 
Currency Union”, 15 December 19^1, para. Jl, in Collected 
Writings, vol. 25* 
Keynes to R.F. Harrod, 19 April 19^1 f in 
Collected Writings, vol. 25, p. 148, 
’^^PAC, RG19, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-1, R.B. Bryce, 
"Notes on Memorandum Proposing an International Credit [ sic ] 
Union”, 10 October 1942. 
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be unnecessary, especially if a Clearing Union comes into 
QQ 
existence." During the Commonwealth discussions on the 
Clearing Union, Keynes indicated that he was prepared to 
fall back on the American suggestion that the capital-im- 
porting country Impose a control while seeking the permission 
of the capital-exporting country before the movement took 
place. However, as Rasminsky noted, it was " . even 
more difficult for the importing than the exporting country 
to distinguish between capital movements and straightforward 
Q 1 
payments in respect of current trade, etc." This meant 
that the United States would administer every country's 
Q p 
exchange control. In essence, there would be very little 
control if the American proposal were adopted. Rasminsky, 
Clark, and Towers had all come to the conclusion that ex- 
change control was desirable for Canada. But, if exchange 
control operated as proposed in the Clearing Union, American 
investment would continue to flow into Canada and Canada’s 
indebtedness in terms of its ciirrent account obligations to 
the United States would increase with little opportunity for 
Canada to reduce it. 
Keynes to R.F. Harrod, I9 April 19^2, in 
Collected Writings, vol. 25» p. 1^8. 
^^BCA, LR76-188-35» "Post War Economic Talks", Draft 
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting 28 October 1942. 
®^PAC, RGI9, vol. 3989, file T-2-9-2, "Report of the 
Canadian Representatives at the ’Post-War Economic Talks* 
Held in London Between October 23rd and November 9th, 1942", 
part II, "International Clearing Union", n.d., by Rasminsky. 
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Since the American and Canadian proposals were 
intended for current account transactions only, a problem 
existed in disposing of an overall surplus on current account. 
In the interwar period, when such a situation arose, Canada 
was able to invest the surplus abroad or repatriate foreign- 
held securities. Since these were classified as capital 
account transactions, they could not be made under the Stabil- 
ization Fund. Consequently, if Canada obtained United States 
dollars by selling sterling in an amoimt ” greater 
than Canada's current account deficit with the United States, 
Canada would then be obliged to offer to sell the excess 
United States dollars to the fund.'*^^ Under normal circum- 
stances Canada would receive Canadian dollars in exchange 
for the excess American dollars. However, if the Canadian 
dollar had become a scarce currency, Canada •• . might be 
required to hold sterling or to take some other foreign 
QIL 
currency or foreign obligation which she does not want.” 
Obviously, Canada would desire to hold a currency that either 
had a strong demand in the world market or was the currency 
of a country with which Canada wanted to expand trade. In 
Canada's case only one coxmtry, the United States, suited 
either criteria; it actually fit both. 
®3pAC, RGI9, vol. 3981, file M-1-7-2, "Canada-United 
States Discussion of Stabilization Fund Proposals”, 22 April 
19^3, P. 26. 
84 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Because of the United Kingdom’s unusual postwar 
import requirements, sterling was likely to be a plentiful 
currency throughout the world. If Canada opted to hold 
sterling, the only way she could use it would be to import 
more from sterling area countries. This tended to limit 
the freedom of Canadian importers and ultimately of export- 
ers of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Many 
American products had become familiar to Canadians. For 
example, Canada was the second largest exporter of automo- 
biles, many of the components of which came from the United 
States. Consequently, Rasminsky offered a solution to this 
dilemma with the provision that? 
when the Union’s operations have resulted in excess 
sales of the currency of any member country to the extent 
of 75 per cent of the quota of that country the Union 
may, in order to increase its resources of the currency 
in question, attempt to arrange with the member country 
a programme of foreign capital investment or repatria- 
tion and may sell foreign exchange to facilitate such 
capital movements.85 
The reason for this provision was made explicit by Rasminsky 
in an earlier version of his plan? 
... in case the plans do turn out to be bilateralist 
on capital account it provides us with an opening to 
provide additional Canadian dollars to the Fund and thus 
reduce our sterling current account surplus by repatria- 
ting securities from the U.S.A.88 
®%AC, RG19, vol. 3982, file M-1-7-4, Rasminsky, 
"Draft Canadian Proposals for a Foreign Exchange Stabiliza- 
tion Union", 1 June 19^3> section VI(2). 
86 
Ibid., "Proposals for an International Currency 
Stabilisation and Clearing Fund", n.d., section III(70M). 
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In this way Canada could reduce her capital accoiint indebt- 
edness without having to disrupt her trade patterns. Also, 
by repatriating U.S. held securities or investing in the 
United States, Canada would put more United States dollars 
at its disposal. Since American dollars would be in heavy 
demand world-wide, Canada could use them to purchase imports 
or invest in a third country if she so desired. Indeed, 
most countries would be eager to receive American dollars 
and Canada would therefore be in a comfortable position as 
compared to being saddled with sterling. 
CONCLUSION 
During postwar plainning Canadian officials found 
themselves in a position which neither Britain nor the 
United States occupied. In a recent article, John J, Deutsch 
reveals the Canadian position; "Among the greatest concerns 
that we had were two highly unfavourable possibilities with 
regard to postwar developments: the prospect of the continu- 
ing inconvertibility of sterling and economic isolationism by 
the United States.”^ Although United Kingdom officials 
increasingly viewed the sterling area in terms of rectifying 
its troublesome import-export imbalance, Canadian officials 
increasingly viewed the sterling area in terms of the diffi- 
culties in balancing Canada’s international payments by 
utilizing a trade surplus with Britain against a trade deficit 
with the United States. 
^John J. Deutsch, "Canadian Views", in A.L.K. Acheson, 
J.F. Chant and M.F.J. Prachowny, (eds.), Bretton Woods Revis- 
ited; Evaluations of the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Deyeloument. 
(Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. ^5* 
l6l 
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The first few years of war amply demonstrated to 
Canadians the problems caused by the inconvertibility of 
sterling. Even though Keynes’ Clearing Union did not 
advocate inconvertibility per se, the management of a cur- 
rency bloc, as proposed in the Clearing Union, had virtually 
the same effect for the Canadian economy,. With the incon- 
vertibility of sterling, Canada had two methods of reducing 
its international payments problems: to decrease exports 
to the. sterling area or to increase imports from; the sterling 
area. Currency blocs, while permitting ’free-trade* within 
this area, would tend to balance exports from the bloc with 
imports to the bloc. Although no one particular country 
would necessarily be forced to balance its trade with the 
bloc, Canada would nevertheless find itself under increasing 
pressure to balaince its trade with the sterling area. The 
reason Canada was susceptible to this pressiire was owing to 
the disruption in trade caused by the war. During the early 
postwar period many of the sterling area countries would 
have to look outside the bloc for goods needed to re-build 
their economies. Consequently, because of the inherent 
nature of the sterling bloc, pressure would be exerted on 
virtually every country exporting to the sterling area to 
balance their trade by increasing their sterling imports. 
From a political standpoint, it would be almost 
impossible for Canada to decrease exports to the sterling 
area. Economically, decreasing exports to the sterling area 
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would decrease the level .of economic activity in Canada 
because no alternate export market was available to Canadian 
producers. However, increasing imports from the sterling 
area might have had devastating effects on the Canadiain 
economy. First, it would shift the close association of 
Canadian manufacturers with their United States counterparts 
to a closer association with British manufacturers. The 
possibility of this occurring raised fears in Canada that 
the growing Canadian industrial economy would be vulnerable 
to pressures by British manufacturing interests. There were 
also the financial problems associated with increasing 
Canada's trade with the sterling area. Even if Canada had 
increased its trade with the sterling area ,it would still 
possess a heavy investment debt owed to the United States. 
Because of the experiences encountered in the interwar period, 
when sterling decreased relative to the American dollar, 
Canadians knew the difficulties that arose servicing a finan- 
cial debt owed in one currency with another currency. The 
Canadian officials rejected the British proposals because 
of the difficulties presented to the Canadian economy. 
The American isolationists also presented problems 
for the Canadian economy. These isolationists assumed two 
forms. The first, and the more extreme, were represented by 
the *autarchists*. These isolationists desired a restricted 
continental economy that would shield the United States from 
European disruptions. Such a continental economy would tear 
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Canada's traditional trade relationship apart and would have 
"effectively shackled Canada to the United States”. Fortu- 
nately the 'multilateralists* were in the ascendency and 
Canadian officials did not have to deal with the autarchist 
agenda beyond ensiiring international support for the multi- 
lateralists. The second form of American economic isloation- 
ism was moderate, but nevertheless existed within the multi- 
lateralists. The multilateralists viewed the development of 
the Grand Area as a means of achieving, if not world peace, 
at least a stable economic environment that would ensure the 
United States' security. Although these multilateralists 
emphasized multilateral trade and financial relations which 
included most of the non-German world, they did not have the 
same sense of urgency to include the United Kingdom as had 
Canadian officials. As much as the multilateralists wanted 
to include Britain, several occasions arose which threatened 
to destroy Anglo-American cooperation. In late 1942, just 
after the American elections, and into early 1943t Anglo- 
American relations were at a low point. This deterioration 
in Anglo-American relations caused many Canadians to doubt 
the possibility of an Anglo-American partnership in an inter- 
national financial organization. Without such a partnership 
the United Kingdom would likely pursue its proposals irre- 
spective of the American or Canadian plans. Leaving aside 
the disadvantages which the British proposals presented to 
the Canadian economy, an Anglo-American partnership was 
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desirable because the American proposal was inadequate to 
meet the problems encountered by countries such as Canada, 
which traded extensively in two different currency areas. 
The American plan provided an effective means of facilitating 
multilateral relations but only for current account trans- 
actions. Canada, which had relied upon American investment 
to build its economy, needed a means to convert trade surplus 
to a capital accoimt transaction. However, since Canada's 
trade surplus came from the sterling area, and since the 
American plan allowed currency purchases for current account 
transactions only, Canada would not be permitted to meet its 
debt obligations to the United States with its trade surplus 
from the United Kingdom. Although the Canadian plan provided 
for converting a trade surplus to a capital account trans- 
action, without the participation of Britain and the sterling 
area it was doubtful whether the United States would have 
fully appreciated the value of this provision in the Canadian 
plan. 
Although Canadian officials were most anxious for 
Anglo-American cooperation, it was not sufficient that the 
United States and the United Kingdom merely sat together to 
discuss world economic matters. These Canadians recognized 
that Canada’s interests were distinct from either the United 
States or the United Kingdom. As a result bilateral talks 
between these two great nations would not ensure that Cana- 
dian interests would be satisfied. Consequently, Canadian 
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officials strove diligently to iDe represented at discussions 
that affected Canada’s economic interests. However, gaining 
this representation was not always easy. Diiring the Common- 
wealth talks of late October 19^2, Canada was adamant in 
refusing official sanction of the British proposals because 
it did not want a united Commonwealth front presented to the 
United States. As a result, Canadian influence on the British 
proposals was limited. In discussions with the Americans, 
Canadian officials were more eager to assert Canadian inter- 
ests. Owing to the fact that much of Canada’s interests 
involved its connection to the sterling area, several 
Americans had difficulty discerning Canada as independent 
from the United Kingdom. Consequently, many Americans 
tended to view Canadian proposals as the extent to which the 
British would compromise. Indeed, British officials often 
had difficulty in discerning an independent Canadiaui interest 
and tended to view Canada’s role as a ’Trojan horse’ in which 
British interests would be concealed in a Canadian proposal 
in an effort to coerce the Americans into a compromise. 
Keynes’ bitterness towards the presentation of the Canadian 
plan reflected this aspect of British attitudes towards 
Canada: 
... we were much upset by the Canadian draft. ... It 
all seems a great misfortune. The Canadian re-draft is, 
of course, a great improvement so far as it goes. All 
the changes are for the better, and the drafting has been 
improved or made much clearer in many points of detail. 
But this makes one all the sorrier that it has been put 
so definitely at this stage. For at a later date and 
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with some further changes it might have been so easy 
for Canada to take the really decisive part of producing 
a mediated scheme. As it is they are wasting their 
ammimition. Really a most awful pity.2 
Keynes did not consider that Canadian interests would not be 
served in his definition of a "mediated scheme”. In spite 
of the difficulties encountered in asserting Canadian 
interests, the level of expertise of several Canadian offici- 
als and the desire to assert Canadian interests ensured 
that Canada was effectively represented in the informal 
postwar financial discussions. 
p 
Keynes to D.H. Robertson, 11 June 19^3» Collected 
Writings, vol. 25, p. 298, 
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